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W hy not prevent pollution, rather than have to clean it up
afterwards? This simple question is, increasingly, a starting
point for much of today's environmental policy discussion.
Traditional environmental protection law has focused on pollution
control - the cleanup after pollution has already occurred- rather
than on preventing pollution at the onset. Yet, this pollution control
policy is costly and often limited in what it can accomplish. More
fundamentally, pollution control only treats the symptoms of
pollution rather than correcting its cause.
The emerging conventional wisdom calls for a new regulatory
approach which emphasizes preventing pollution rather than the
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traditional scheme of controlling pollution after it has been
created.' Twenty-five years ago the emphasis on control was an
understandable response to the public demands for real environ-
mental protection.2 As environmental awareness exploded on the
national policy scene in the late 1960s, the need was to give teeth
to environmental protection law. The general consensus among
various congressional committees was that the pollution control
efforts in place were weak and ineffective.3 Consequently, these
groups called for stricter rules and real enforcement.
Responding to these demands, Congress passed new
environmental legislation and established the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to promulgate and enforce regulations.4
The rationale was that robust environmental protection law required
robust regulations.5 Thus, policy makers turned to the regulator and
1. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH NEEDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Kurt Fischer &
Johan Schot eds., 1993) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUS-
TRY]. For an good introduction see Nicholas A. Ashford, Understanding Techno-
logical Responses of Industrial Firms to Environmental Problems: Implications
for Government Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY supra, at
277. See also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, THE GREENING OF INDUS-
TRIAL ECOSYSTEMS (Braden R. Allenby & Deanna J. Richards eds., 1994); NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, TRANSFORMING ENVI-
RONMENTAL PERMITTING AND COMPLIANCE POLICIES To PROMOTE POLLUTION
PREVENTION (EPA 100/R-93-004, 1993); BEYOND COMPLIANCE: A NEW INDUS-
TRY VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Bruce Smart ed., 1992) [hereinafter BEYOND
COMPLIANCE]; GEORGE R. HEATON ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE,
TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: AN AGENDA FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAIN-
ABLE GROWTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1991); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: FOR
POLLUTION PREVENTION AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY (OTA-ITE-317 1986)
[hereinafter SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE].
2. See Braden R. Allenby, Integrating Environment and Technology: Design
for Environment, in THE GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 1,
at 137.
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 3.1.A.4.
& 4.1.A.4. (2d ed. 1994); FRANK P. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: SOURCES
AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1978); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LAW OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION § 10.02 (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 1994).
4. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at § 10.02.
5. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 129, 252.
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her commands, and pollution control was the natural result.
The new legislation authorized regulators to use controls 6 to
restrain polluters. Controls fit well with the prevailing attitudes that
polluters were bad and should be restrained for the public good.
During a period of economic growth, this system7 has achieved
some success at pollution control. However, by focussing almost
exclusively on regulations, the pollution control system typically
does not require or inspire the initiative and innovation from
regulated businesses to develop and implement cleaner
technologies! As a result, the control system has missed most of
the opportunities to promote pollution prevention.
To promote a prevention policy, we must focus on regulated
businesses rather than regulatory agencies. Although regulators can
craft and enforce rules designed to control pollution, only industrial
and commercial leaders can prevent pollution by the businesses
they run. Business people make the decisions about the processes,
materials, and products that generate pollution. Preventing that
pollution requires business people to make different decisions - to
operate their businesses differently. This Article argues that only
business can conceive and implement the innovative technological
changes that pollution prevention requires. Thus, we must
understand the innovation and organizational dynamics of en-
vironmental technological change in order to make effective policy
to encourage and support them.9
6. Traditionally, controls have consisted of either health-based ambient stan-
dards designed to protect human health and the environment from excessive pol-
lution or technology-based emission limits placed on the individual polluters. See
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at § 11.01.
7. Under the current system, the EPA is empowered, by applicable statute, to
make and enforce regulations designed to control and punish polluters. Cf Kurt
A. Strasser, Pollution Control in an Era of Economic Redevelopment: An Over-
view, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 425, 427-31 (1993).
8. A "regulated business" is any licensed business that is subject to the pol-
lution control measures found in various environmental statutes, including but not
limited to, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7401 (1994), and the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
9. Pollution prevention typically requires new technology that is more envi-
ronmentally friendly, or, to put it another way, cleaner technology rather than the
cleaning technology emphasized today. A forthcoming article will build on this
richer understanding of the business realities of pollution prevention and examine
1996]
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This Article will examine prevention from the perspective of
polluting companies rather than regulators. This Article will
consider how companies promote prevention and why it presently
does not occur more often. It will then discuss the individual and
organizational efforts which are needed and what leads to these
efforts by some companies and not others. Part I briefly reviews the
importance of pollution prevention. Part II considers the kinds of
innovative efforts that companies must make to create new
technology which will prevent pollution. Part III will then evaluate
the organizational support required to fuel these innovative efforts
and then to get them implemented. Part IV discusses the industrial
ecology and related ideas which offer exciting possibilities for
thinking about prevention policy more deeply and with an expanded
time horizon.
I. POLLUTION PREVENTION INSTEAD OF POLLUTION CONTROL
A. New Policy Focus and Business Dynamics
Pollution prevention means producing, distributing, and consum-
ing products in an economic society without creating as much or,
ideally, any pollution.' It usually involves technological change.
how the existing pollution control regulatory system both promotes and retards
pollution prevention and environmental technology development. Later work will
consider voluntary pollution promotion programs and regulatory requirements for
pollution prevention planning. Kurt A. Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution
Prevention and Environmental Regulation, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming
1997) (manuscript on file at FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL office).
10. A number of different terms and concepts are used in connection with the
idea of pollution prevention. The usage here is intended to be broad and to en-
compass all efforts that reduce the creation of waste residuals or that reuse resid-
uals that are created. Thus "prevention" includes: reducing the generation of
wastes at the source (source reduction) as well as internal and external reuse of
wastes in recycling or other operations. See Ashford, supra note 1, at 278. Both
reduction and reuse can decrease the discharge of waste residuals to the envi-
ronment.
Technological change is typically required, either in using existing technol-
ogy differently or in creating or implementing new technology. The Amoco-
Yorktown Project, found that source reduction made up less than half of the total
pollution reduction opportunities available at the refinery. Amoco-U.S. EPA
Pollution Prevention Project, Yorktown, Virginia, Project Summary (revised June
1992) at 1-9 [hereinafter Amoco-Yorktown Project].
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To understand how to accomplish this, one must compare a pollu-
tion prevention policy with the current control policy.
Pollution control requires limiting the discharge of pollutants,
which are usually the by-products of either production or consump-
tion, to air, water, or land after the pollutants have been produced.
The policy focus of pollution control is on how regulators seek to
control pollution and the expectation that regulated entities, largely
businesses, will comply with regulators' commands. Policy ques-
tions are framed from this perspective. For example, policy ques-
tions at the heart of pollution control regulation include the follow-
ing: the concentration of lead in the ambient air that can be tolerat-
ed before adverse health or ecosystem effects result;" the degree
of pollutant removal from a waste stream which is technologically
possible to require; 2 the amount of discharge of biological oxygen
a waste stream can absorb without lowering water quality; 3 and,
whether a particular waste source has met the lowest achievable
emissions rate. 4
The command process is of central concern, first' in issuing regu-
latory standards and later in surviving the judicial scrutiny of these
standards and their enforcement. Pollution control policy tries to
pinpoint effective commands rather than focus on the complexity or
variety of behavior expected in response to these commands. This
approach assumes that, with strong enforcement of the right regula-
tions, regulated businesses will either choose, or be forced, to com-
Controversy and confusion arise because the EPA and others use the term
prevention more narrowly to mean only source reduction, with recycling or reuse
separate categories. See Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 13101
(1994); Environmental Protection" Agency Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed.
Reg. 7849 (1991). This usage emphasizes policy preference among a hierarchy of
different methods of reducing waste residuals discharge. Prevention is most pre-
ferred and the others are ranked under it. This Article prefers the broader usage
because it better supports my emphasis on business programs.
Finally, sustainable development is a broad concept and another frequently
used term which includes prevention and many other ideas. In encouraging the
development of clean technology, pollution prevention can be part of sustainable
development. See HEATON ET AL., supra note 1, at vii, 30.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 50.12 (1996).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994).
13. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(2) (1994).
1996]
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ply.
As noted above, this control system has produced generally
cleaner air, water, and land over the last twenty-five years. 5 There
have been a few dramatic pollution reduction successes, often the
result of stringent controls or outright product bans. 16 However,
product bans are usually not a realistic policy option because satis-
factory product substitutes are frequently unavailable. 7 Despite
some success achieved by imposing technology on industry, 8 most
often this command and control system does not adequately encour-
age new environmental technology and pollution prevention. 9 In
15. See Allenby, supra note 2, at 137.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 50.12 (1996).
For example, banning lead from gasoline has resulted in drastically lower
levels of lead in the ambient air, and much lower average levels in children's
blood. "Between 1985 and 1994 average lead concentrations in urban areas
throughout the country decreased 86 percent while total lead emissions decreased
75 percent." OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, EPA,
Am QUALITY TRENDS 6 (EPA-454/F-95-003, 1995) [hereinafter Am QUALrrY
TRENDS].
Note that local concentrations, particularly for inner city children, continue
to be a major public health problem. The technological responses of business to
product bans is reviewed in this Article's companion, Strasser, supra note 9
(manuscript at 58-68). General product bans, when used, have provoked techno-
logical innovation by business. Id.
17. For example, banning automobiles powered by the internal combustion
engine would produce a substantial improvement in present problems with urban
smog and air toxins. However, such a ban is not seriously discussed because, at
present, no alternative technology is available.
18. For example, although the process took ten years of legislative, adminis-
trative, and judicially ordered delays, the Congressional mandate for cleaner auto-
mobile emissions eventually led to technological improvements which have en-
abled the average vehicle to produce much less pollution per mile. See, e.g.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTrrUTE, supra note 3, § 11.06. Unfortunately, the in-
crease in miles traveled has offset much of the net environmental improvement in
pollution discharged per mile. The emissions reduction does not address the ques-
tion of whether pollution was prevented in the manufacturing process. Id.
19. See Strasser, supra note 9 (manuscript at 40-44) (reviewing history of
delays). The experience is that, at best, environmental standards usually wind up
requiring only the application of known technologies or methods, rather than
development of new ones. See, e.g., D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology Forcing and
Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REv. 771, 773-75, 800
(1977). The level of innovation and technological response from business is
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contrast, pollution prevention and environmental technology change
require a creative response from business which is difficult to man-
date through command and control regulation.
Pollution prevention begins by focusing policy on regulated com-
panies rather than regulators and their commands. Prevention seeks
to encourage business to make the technological changes necessary
to operate with less resulting pollution. We must consider whether
business can change its operations, what kinds of changes are re-
quired, and how environmental policy can require or inspire them.
A careful examination of pollution prevention efforts which have
found success in business illustrates the way a prevention policy
can effectively lead businesses to employ new technologies.
B. The Advantages of Prevention
Pollution prevention has become the new mantra of environmen-
tal policy discourse because it offers, at least in theory, several
advantages over the more familiar pollution control strategy.0 As
a backdrop for the rest of this Article, this section will briefly sur-
vey the benefits of pollution prevention.
1. A Cleaner Environment At A Lower Cost
Prevention should be a much cheaper strategy for achieving a
cleaner environment. This is an intrinsically persuasive idea - "an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Although this coun-
try has worked seriously at pollution control for twenty-five years,
with some real success,2 this success has been expensive, and
mixed, depending, among other things, on industry and firm specific factors. See,
e.g., Ashford, supra note 1, at 277-78.
20. There is vast literature on the merits of pollution prevention. For an intro-
duction and survey, see generally ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY,
supra note 1; BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1; CHANGING COURSE: A
GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(Stephen Schmidheiny ed., MIT Press 1992) [hereinafter CHANGING COURSE];
POLLUTION PREVENTION DIVISION, EPA, POLLUTION PREVENTION 1991: PROG-
RESS ON REDUCING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTANTS (EPA 21P-3003, 1991) [hereinafter
POLLUTION PREVENTION 1991]; HEATON ET AL., supra note 1; SERIOUS REDUC-
TION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 1. POLLUTION PREVENTION HANDBOOK
(Thomas Higgins ed., 1995)
21. For example, between the enactment of the Clean Air Act in 1970 and
1996]
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costs are expected to rise.22
In addition, there is a growing consensus that environmental
cleanup through the present control system has reached a plateau.23
While the regulatory system becomes more complex and demand-
ing, the rate of environmental improvement appears to be slowing
and perhaps even stopping. An increasing amount of regulatory
effort seems to be required for each increment of environmental
protection. Continued improvement will require a much more ex-
tensive system of controls, which will inevitably become more expensive.
In contrast, prevention offers the prospect of greater environmen-
1994, the combined emissions of the six principal air pollutants decreased 24 per-
cent, the U.S. population increased 27 percent, vehicle miles traveled increased
111 percent and gross domestic product increased 90 percent. During this period
the introduction of unleaded gas decreased lead emissions by 98 percent. AIR
QUALrrY TRENDS, supra note 16, at 4. "Low dissolved oxygen levels were a
pollution problem in streams and rivers 20 years ago but are rarely encountered
today because of an overall, reduction in point discharges of oxygen-demanding
wastes. In the decade following 1972, municipal loads of biochemical oxygen
demand decreased by an estimated 46%, and industrial loads decreased by at least
71%, nationally." COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY, ExECUTIvE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS, 62-68 (1989).
22. See SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS DIVISION, EPA, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL INVESTMENTS: THE COST OF A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT (EPA-230-12-90-084,
1990) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS]. With enforcement at current
levels, the 1990 cost of all pollution control activities is estimated at $115 billion,
2.1% of GNP. Id. at v. By the year 2000 this cost is projected to grow to $171
billion (in 1990 dollars), 2.6% of GNP, with enforcement at current levels. Id.
The impact of this cost on profitability, jobs, competitiveness, and innova-
tion, is less clear. A careful recent review of the evidence concludes that little or
no evidence supports the conclusion that environmental regulation hurts either
profitability or job creation. See ROBERT REPETTO, JOBS, COMPETITIVENESS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: WHAT ARE THE REAL ISSUES? 19, 22 (1995). In
ADAM B. JAFFE ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. INDUSTRY (July 1993), the
authors review more than 100 academic and government studies and conclude
that little evidence documents the view that environmental regulation has had a
"measurable adverse effect on competitiveness." Id. at iii. See The Challenge of
Going Green, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1994, at 37, 38-39 (comments of
Richard N. Stavins).
23. See Amoco - Yorktown Project, supra note 10, at 1-13. The study cites
the opinions of representatives from EPA, Amoco Corp., the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and various members of academia. Id.
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tal protection from pollution at a lower cost. A cooperative study of
the Yorktown refinery, done jointly by the EPA and Amoco, illus-
trates this "point.24 Using only the four most attractive prevention
options, the refinery could have eliminated almost as much pollu-
tion as all existing and anticipated regulatory requirements25 at less
than one-fourth the cost.26
For business, investing in prevention will typically lead to better
results than simply investing in compliance measures. A Dow inter-
nal study concluded that the environmental funds used to comply
with regulations (ninety percent of total environmental spending)
realized a thirteen percent return on the investment." In contrast,
the environmental funds allocated to more innovative prevention
efforts (the remaining ten percent of total funds) resulted in greater
than a fifty percent return. 2' Another study, an internal analysis of
over 700 efforts by DuPont, found that on average "its internally
generated environmental initiatives are three times as cost-effective
24. This peer-reviewed study only included the available prevention projects
which would exclusively use existing technology. Id. at 1-9 to 1-12. Even with
these limits, prevention was a much cheaper way to reduce pollution discharge. It
is worth speculating why these projects had not been undertaken anyway, regard-
less of the regulatory system. However, the regulatory system commanded other
efforts, and this likely exhausted the resources and initiative available for envi-
ronmental protection. In addition, these were typically unregulated sources, so
cleaning them up offered no regulatory benefit. Id.
25. 7,300 tons and 6,900 tons. Id. at 1-10 to 1-12.
26. $2,400 per ton compared to $500 per ton. Id. at 1-11.
27. Sustainable Development Council Members Discuss Voluntary Business
Participation, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), June 16, 1993.
28. Id. Presumably, the more innovative projects were riskier, and a complete
comparison of returns would have to adjust for this; the risk adjusted returns
might not have been as high.
A 1993 study of six facilities with effective pollution prevention programs
found that, even for these facilities, compliance expenditures were greater than
prevention expenditures. No comparative returns were computed, although most
did require prevention projects to compete for funding on the basis of return on
investment. AT&T BELL LABORATORIES QUEST ORGANIZATION, THE BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE FACILITY POLLUTION PREVENTION BENCHMARKING STUDY 12
(1993) [hereinafter BENCHMARKING STUDY]. A 1986 OTA study concluded that,
at that time, most environmental expenditures by business were for compliance
rather than prevention. See SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra
note 1, at 3.
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as those that respond to government regulations."29
Prevention can be a good investment in its own right." For ex-
ample, the Benchmarking Study concluded that to be sustainable
most prevention projects had to be cost effective.3 In four of the
six facilities studied, prevention projects successfully competed with
all other capital improvement projects for allocations from the
annual budget, based on return on investment.32 Similarly, other
case studies33 have shown that prevention projects are good cost-
saving investments.34 However, care should be taken not to claim
too much: not all prevention projects can be justified solely by
comparative return on investment. Nevertheless, when regulatory
costs and the public relations value of good environmental perfor-
mance are considered, prevention is typically still a good invest-
ment.3"
29. The Challenge of Going Green, supra note 22, at 46 (comments of Rich-
ard P. Wells).
30. See, e.g., Mark Trumbull, It's Easier Not to Pollute in the First Place,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 6, 1992, at 7. Frank Popoff, Companies
Change Course; Progressive Companies Will Merge Economies and Environ-
ment, EPA JOURNAL, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 26.
This was not consistently the case with the Amoco-Yorktown study. Pre-
vention sometimes paid for itself, sometimes not. See Amoco-Yorktown Project,
supra note 10, at 1-10. However, the study noted that accounting systems were
partly to blame for this - they did not allocate environmental control costs to
the activity creating the waste, thus making waste prevention appear less valu-
able. Id. at 1-14.
31. BENCHMARIUNG STUDY, supra note 28, at 10, 24.
32. Id. The other two set aside 20% of the annual capital improvement budget
for environmental projects. However, one of these then required environmental
projects to then compete for these funds. Id.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. This is a particularly robust result considering that many corporate ac-
counting systems do not accurately connect waste generation expenses with waste
creation activities, making reduction or elimination of the waste appear to be less
valuable than it actually is.
35. Compare Noah Walley & Bradley Whitehead, It's Not Easy Being Green,
HARV. Bus. REV. May-June 1994, at 46 and James Lis & Kenneth Chilton, Lim-
its of Pollution Prevention, SOCIETY, MarJApr. 1993, at 49 (arguing that pre-
vention may not always be a good investment) with The Challenge of Going
Green, supra note 22, at 37.
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2. Promoting Environmental and Economic Development
Pollution prevention offers a way to ameliorate the tension be-
tween achieving environmental protection and promoting economic
development. Prevention efforts naturally support creating and
implementing new technology, and have the potential to support
and enhance company performance programs.3 6 To prevent pollu-
tion, business must rethink how it operates. This includes re-evalu-
ating raw material inputs, production and distribution processes,
products, and waste creation. Such critical and innovative activity,
essential for pollution prevention, can also serve the goals of main-
taining and improving economic competitiveness.37
Prevention provokes a much different response from business
than the typical reaction to traditional pollution control. The com-
mand-oriented regulatory system does not foster a business mindset
leading to innovation." Yet, the regulatory system largely defines
the market for environmental innovation and technology develop-
ment.39 Thus, if the command and control regulatory system does
36. See infra Part II (arguing prevention requires innovative efforts from
business).
37. See Ashford, supra note 1, at 277 and Patricia S. Dillon, Implications of
Industrial Ecology for Firms, in THE GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS,
supra note 1, at 201, for an excellent discussions of the business responses need-
ed for environmental innovation. For business, the ultimate goal should be to
integrate environmental waste reduction into the regular operations of product and
process design. Sheldon K. Friedlander, Environmental Issues: Implications for
Engineering Design and Education, in TECHNOLOGY AND ENvIRONMENT 167
(Jesse H. Ausbel & Hedy E. Sladovich eds., 1989). The BENCHMARKING STUDY,
supra note 28, at 10-11, 21, 32, found that effective prevention programs inte-
grate prevention into their business planning, and make it part of the pre-manu-
facturing decisions and choices in the product research, development, and design
process.
38. The general question of the effect of regulatory systems on business inno-
vation is complex and much studied. For an excellent introduction and survey,
see Ashford, supra note 1, at 277. The impact of environmental regulation on the
creation and implementation of new environmental technology is discussed in
detail in Strasser, supra note 9, (manuscript at 35-114).
39. Friedlander, supra note 37, at 167. A Dutch study of environmental inno-
vation found similar effects in the Dutch regulatory control system. Hans
Dieleman & Sybreh de Hoo, Toward a Tailor-made Process of Pollution Pre-
vention and Cleaner Production- Results and Implications of the PRISMA Pro-
19961
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not require the use of new technology, then business will be less
likely to buy it, and, more fundamentally, to develop it.
Consider DuPont's considerable efforts to find substitutes for the
CFCs that are destroying the ozone layer.' After a substantial ef-
fort in the early 1980s, DuPont reduced its research and develop-
ment program when it seemed that regulatory controls would not be
forthcoming." Without such controls, the market for the substi-
tutes would be small, and therefore, developing substitutes was no
longer a high business priority.42 In the late 1980s, when it be-
came clear that regulatory controls would be imposed, DuPont
increased its research and development efforts. 3 Thus, research
and development of new technology was prompted by regulatory
initiatives, rather than by technological possibilities.
In the DuPont example, the regulatory system used a product ban
to inspire technology development. Product bans, however, are less
typical than pollution control standards that are set with reference
to familiar technological possibilities." Business's typical response
to the traditional pollution control system has been to buy a clean-
up gadget, usually for the end-of-the-pipe or the end-of-the-smoke-
stack, that implements familiar technology.45 This device is often
expensive, does not otherwise contribute to company performance,
and is thus seen as a dead-weight cost.' After paying for these
ject, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 245, 269-
70.
40. This description is taken from Joseph P. Glas, Protecting the Ozone Lay-
er: A Perspective from Industry, in TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note
37, at 137. Mr. Glas was employed by DuPont and worked in this program at
that time.
41. Id. at 142-43.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 147.
44. For a discussion of the use of product bans and the likely business re-
sponse, see Strasser, supra note 9 (manuscript at 58-68).
45. See Hugh E. Williams et al., Corporate Strategies for a Sustainable Fu-
ture, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 117, 139.
46. Id.; NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
TECHNOLOGY, EPA, IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, 74-75 (EPA 130-R-92-001, 1992) [hereinafter IMPROVING TECH-
NOLOGY DIFFUSION]; HEATON ET AL., supra note 1, at 24; see also Dieleman &
de Hoo, supra note 39, at 245, 269-70 (similar end of the pipe focus in develop-
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devices, industry often loses enthusiasm for any further investment
in environmental technology.'
Although the business response has been reactive and defensive,
rather than innovative, there are some signs of change." From
1970 to 1985, a leading study concluded that the attitude of most
companies toward environmental compliance was one of "resistant
adaptation."'49 Environmental response was a plant-level issue,
treated as simply one more (increasingly onerous) regulatory chore.
The business objective was mere compliance, which meant using
the most convenient end-of-the-pipe technology. From 1985 to 1992
(the date that this study was published), the authors saw some
change in company attitudes toward environmental protection."
Today, while companies are embracing environmental issues,
they are doing so with little innovation.5' Environmental issues re-
ceive more consideration, but businesses still do not integrate envi-
ronmental considerations into long-term planning and decision-
ing new technology that resulted from government standards for end of the pipe
discharge).
47. Lis & Chilton, supra note 35, at 52.
48. A recent study of 562 German companies notes some change, but con-
cludes:
Nevertheless, it is clear that motives for change are more strongly
founded on avoiding risk than on grasping new market opportunities.
Compliance is still a very important inducement for company behav-
ior. Environmental issues are still connected mainly with production
(process modifications) and technical issues. The influence of environ-
mental issues on the full range of company activities is not taken into
account - for example, R & D activities are seldom driven by envi-
ronmental considerations.
Ulrich Steger, The Greening of the Board Room: How German Companies Are
Dealing with Environmental Issues, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR IN-
DUSTRY, supra note 1, at 147, 164.
49. Johan Schot & Kurt Fischer, Introduction: The Greening of the Industrial
Firm, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 3, 6-8.
An influential 1985 study of 44 source reduction practices at 29 plants in the
chemical industry concluded that reduction was typically the last choice, even
among these plants that had embraced it eventually, and a choice that was typi-
cally motivated by external regulatory or economic stimuli. DAVID J. SAROKIN ET
AL., CUTrING CHEMICAL WASTES 34 (1985).
50. Schot & Fischer, supra note 49, at 8-11.
51. Id.
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making. Promoting pollution prevention and new environmental
technology can lead to increased innovation and the integration of
environmental issues more fully into the culture of the organization.
To implement effective prevention measures, a third phase of busi-
ness response is needed.
Real prevention efforts should, over the long run, support and
reinforce other efforts at innovation and thereby encourage im-
proved business performance. Prevention often requires investment,
but that investment can support other business goals, with the costs
frequently recouped in a short time. Seen in this light, it is not
surprising that many large companies have publicly embraced pol-
lution prevention as a policy and implemented many specific pro-
jects and programs geared toward prevention."2
3. Prevention Encourages Business To Use Knowledge To
Support Environmental Protection
A new business approach to environmental protection goals high-
lights a third advantage of pollution prevention. A prevention policy
encourages a business to use its knowledge, energy, and initiative
to support environmental protection, rather than obstruct it. Our
present control system gives a business strong incentives to use its
knowledge to argue for more permissive standards in the regulatory
process.53 Indeed, there is substantial scholarship showing that our
present pollution control system tends to set standards at some
variant of the best available technology, only to discourage devel-
opment of cleaner technology. 4 In contrast, a prevention approach
52. See infra Part III (discussing company programs and policies that support
prevention).
53. Schot & Fischer, supra note 49, at 8-12. The statement in the text, while
generally accurate, is overbroad. Firms within an industry that have superior
cleanup technology can argue for stricter standards to secure a competitive advan-
tage over their less advanced competitors. In addition, firms outside an industry
that design and make cleanup gadgets have an obvious incentive to argue for a
standard that their gadget can meet. Ideally, these firms seek a standard that only
their gadget can meet.
54. See, e.g., Natalie M. Dersko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regula-
tory Processes to Foster Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technolo-
gies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 3, 19-21 (1996); Strasser, supra note 9 (manu-
script at 144-50) (discussing the impact of traditional environmental regulation on
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encourages business to design, build, and use increasingly cleaner
technology by offering the rewards for doing so.
4. More Effective Environmental Protection
Finally, pollution prevention offers the prospect of more effective
environmental protection. In some instances, our present command
and control system results in simply shifting pollution from a more
carefully regulated medium to a less carefully regulated one.5 In
this situation, shifting the pollution is cheaper than developing new
technology to prevent it. Such shifting can, in a particular set of
circumstances, result in compliance with the requirements of the
regulatory system, because the requirements differ for the various
media without offering actual environmental protection. The envi-
ronmental impact of such inter-media transfer can be negative and
there is no a priori reason to assume that it will be positive. 6 Pre-
venting, rather than shifting, pollution offers real environmental
protection.
These advantages demonstrate that a prevention strategy would
be more effective than the present control strategy. The end result,
at least in happy theory, will be a cleaner environment, achieved at
lower cost, involving less regulatory interference with business
operations, and with environmental protection policy supporting and
encouraging improved business competitiveness. Considering all
these advantages, it is not surprising that pollution prevention is the
current policy favorite.
Implementing this attractive theoretical possibility, however, has
not proven to be a simple task. To effectively support pollution
prevention and the associated environmental technology, policy
makers must expand their understanding of business and organiza-
tional realities. The remainder of this Article will discuss these
business realities.
prevention).
55. Schot & Fischer, supra note 49, at 13.
56. Id.
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II. THE VARIETIES OF INNOVATION IN POLLUTION PREVENTION
Effective pollution prevention demands a creative, innovative
response from business.57 The variety of such responses range
from simple, straightforward housekeeping changes," to changing
a cleaning solution or other material input,59 to more fundamental
redesign of industrial processes' and, eventually, redesign of
products.6' These technological changes are potential sources of
pollution prevention. Examples of such technological change, most
dealing with cleaning parts during industrial operations, illustrate
this range of responses. 2 This section will discuss changes in the
production processes and the next section will consider redesign of
products.
57. The term innovation presents a semantic difficulty here. In the economic
analysis of technological change, three distinct stages are separated for purposes
of analysis. Invention, the first stage, involves creating new scientific or techno-
logical knowledge. The second stage, conventionally labeled innovation, is the
development of this invention through the prototype stage until a commercially
viable product or technology results. The third stage, diffusion, is the spread of
this innovation effort. This Article uses the term innovation in a broader, more
popular sense, to refer to any of the three processes as they relate to accomplish-
ing pollution prevention.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 67, 68.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 77-85.
61. See infra Part II.B. For a brief general discussion of all of these various
approaches see SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 1, at 78-
83.
62. These examples are selected from a vast literature, some of it rather tech-
nical. For excellent non-technical introductions, see BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra
note 1, at ch. 2; CHANGING COURSE, supra note 20, at chs. 7, 15 and 16.
Two studies, prepared by Abt Associates for the EPA, collected references
and data for all the case study literature through January, 1994. POLLUTION PRE-
VENTION AND Toxic SUBSTANCES, EPA, ABSTRACTS OF POLLUTION PREVENTION
CASE STUDY SOURCES (EPA 742-B-94-001, 1994) collects all the literature dis-
cussing both single and multiple case studies. POLLUTION PREVENTION AND Tox-
IC SUBSTANCES, EPA, SUMMARY OF POLLUTION PREVENTION CASE STUDIES
WITH ECONOMIC DATA (By SIC CODES) (EPA 742-S-94-001, 1994) presents
basic economic data from 207 specific case studies in tabular form. The EPA's
Pollution Prevention Information Clearinghouse ("PPIC") and its Pollution Pre-
vention Information Exchange System ("PIES") offer a large number of case
studies.
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A. Processes: Changing The Way Products Are Made
There is evidence that changes in production processes are the
most common and the most straightforward pollution prevention
efforts. A 1992 study of source reduction efforts in twenty-nine
chemical industry plants found these to be the most frequent chang-
es in the 181 projects studied.63 Forty-four percent of all projects
involved process changes, thirty-four percent involved operations
changes, and eighteen percent involved equipment changes.' The
projects were successful: each type of change eliminated approxi-
mately seventy percent of the waste stream involved. More inno-
vative changes were less frequently applied, with chemical substitu-
tion being used in only ten percent of the projects and product
changes in only five percent.65 Chemical substitution prevented
only forty-eight percent of the waste. Product changes, however,
were 100 percent successful in eliminating the waste stream in the
three projects where they were used.'
Good housekeeping is the simplest and least expensive pollution
prevention process change. "For example, the proper operation and
63. MARK H. DORFMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DIVIDENDS: CUTrING
MORE CHEMICAL WASTES 48 (1992). This study incorporated the results of an
earlier effort, SAROKIN ET AL., supra note 49.
In six facilities studied in the BENCHMARKING STUDY, there were more
opportunities for pollution prevention by doing chemical substitutions in chemi-
cal-using facilities than in chemical-manufacturing facilities. BENCHMARKING
STUDY, supra note 28, at 12. Process changes redesign the way the manufactur-
ing system is set up. Operations changes involve the way the process is conduct-
ed. Finally, equipment changes involved installing new equipment. More than
one may be involved in a particular innovation.
64. Id.
65. Chemical substitution entails the replacement of certain chemical agents
with alternative agents in order to reduce the resulting waste stream. EPA has
advocated listing and tracking prospective chemical substitute strategies. See
Reporting: TRI Expansion Proposal Gains Steam; Materials Accounting Infor-
mation Eyed, 18 CHEMICAL REG. REP. 787 (1994).
66. Product changes entail the substitution of products, or specific features of
products, with alternatives intended to reduce the product's consumption of non-
renewable energy, the degree to which the product pollutes, or both. See General
Policy: Senate Hearing Examines Technology Issues Related to Environmental
Protection Rules, 23 ENVTL. REP. 2837 (1993).
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regular maintenance of equipment can often substantially reduce
leakage and overuse of materials. Improvements in housekeeping
practices, which can often reduce pollution between a quarter and a
third, usually do not require large capital expenditures."67 In addi-
tion to maintaining equipment and good operating practices, moni-
toring the use of raw materials and their impacts, as well as more
effective inventory controls, can also provide important pollution
prevention support."
1. APS Materials, Inc.
A change in cleaning solutions offers a slightly more complex
example of a technological change. APS Materials, Inc. used 1,1,1-
trichloroethane ("TCA") and methanol to clean orthopedic implants
before they were to be coated with a titanium alloy.69 There is
widespread use of TCA by businesses because it is a most effective
cleaning agent. However, TCA is also one of the environment's
chemical villains. The amount of TCA which evaporates leads to
smog, promotes global warming, and is sometimes toxic.7° In addi-
tion, its use often generates a solid chemical waste that is hazard-
ous, as it did at APS Materials' operation. APS's primary goal was
to eliminate this toxic waste, as disposing of it was becoming "in-
creasingly difficult."7' This demonstration project substituted a
water based cleaner that would not result in hazardous waste.72
Coincidentally, although not the articulated justification for this
project, reduced use of TCA also led to substantial air quality bene-
fits.
In this case, use of the new solvent required some equipment
modifications, at a total capital cost of $1,793.13 No separate cal-
67. CHANGING COURSE, supra note 20, at 101.
68. Id. at 101-02.
69. Chemical Substitution for 1,1,1-Trichloroethane and Methanol In An In-
dustrial Cleaning Operation, in POLLUTION PREVENTION CASE STUDIES





73. "A heater was added to the old ultrasound bath. A deionized water system
was purchased along with a stainless steel bath and immersion heater. A heat gun
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culation was made for management and engineering time used to
decide on, evaluate, and implement the change, presumably because
these services were available in-house and did not require a sepa-
rately identifiable expenditure. Performance testing showed that the
new solvent cleaned the parts satisfactorily and even slightly im-
proved the bonding of the coatings.74 In this situation, environ-
mental protection also produced economic benefits: the annual
savings of $4,800 paid the $1,793 capital cost within four and a
half months." While not universal, a quick return on investment
often makes pollution prevention efforts also attractive business
investments.76
2. General Dynamics Pomona Division
A much more substantial investment was required in the pollution
prevention demonstration project at the General Dynamics Pomona
Division ("General Dynamics") in July, 1988. 7 At General Dy-
namics, the particular problem was cleaning newly-manufactured
computerized printed circuit boards. Previously, General Dynamics
immersed the circuit boards in rinse tanks, which generated sub-
stantial wastewater from the tanks. Chemcut Corporation then in-
stalled a new plating system, including a timed spray rinse that
reduced wastewater from sixty gallons per minute to ten.78 Other
changes in the printing operations not only improved the quality of
the copper plating but also improved the recovery of copper used in
the process, decreasing the amount of waste that required dispos-
al. 79 As a result, the costs of waste treatment, water usage, and
was purchased to quicken the drying process. Other than these equipment addi-
tions, the cleaning procedure remained unchanged." Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Freon Recovery Stills, in CASE STUDIES COMPENDIUM, supra
note 69, at 14-15 (payback period of slightly more than 6 months on a $270,000
investment). See generally, supra notes 34-37.
77. Computerized Printed Circuit Board Plating System, in CASE STUDIES
COMPENDIUM, supra note 69, at 4-6.
78. Id. at 5.
79. "Copper spheres in anode baskets are also used in the new system instead
of a conventional anode bar and hook system that was utilized in the old plating
system. This allows a 1:1 ratio of anode to cathode for a very even plating across
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annual operating expenses all declined. It was calculated that the
new system's $4,100,000 cost would be paid back in 8.3 years.8"
This example clearly shows both the potential and the demands
of pollution prevention and the associated technological change.
Much more than just material substitution was required. Rather, the
pollution prevention effort required General Dynamics to install
new equipment and to implement major operational changes in
materials used, manufacturing processes, and material recovery.
These substantial changes in the operation required General Dy-
namics to invest in more research, planning, and resources. They
also presented a greater business risk if any or all of them did not
perform as planned. However, although the payback time was un-
fortunately longer, the total pollution prevention payoff was much
greater.
3. Zytec Corporation
A third example is the even more ambitious effort undertaken by
Zytec Corporation ("Zytec"), also in the context of cleaning its
newly manufactured circuit boards.81 During the manufacture of
these boards, Zytec used a "flux" to improve the soldering process
and create better connections. However, after soldering, the excess
flux had to be cleaned off the circuit board. The specific environ-
mental problem was that the cleaners in widespread use, and often
required by government and other circuit board. buyers, contained
CFCs that harm the atmospheric ozone layer.8" Zytec's problem
the panel and through the holes.... [The new copper recovery system used]
short-bed ion exchange columns and electrowinning technologies. This system
now produces salable scrap copper metal, eliminating a major waste stream to the
conventional sludge-producing waste treatment system." Id.
80. Id. at 4, 6.
81. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 26-28.
82. CFCs are being phased out under the terms of the Montreal Protocol of
1988 and subsequent implementing conventions and national legislation. The
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
adopted by E.E.C. Council Regulation 3322/88, Oct. 14, 1988, O.J. (L 297) 2.
Adopted by S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, 26 I.L.M. 1541; adjusted by the London
Amendments, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537; adjusted by the Nairobi Amend-
ments, June 21, 1991, and by the Copenhagen Amendments, Nov. 23-25, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 874.
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was that it needed to produce high quality circuit boards, and then
to clean them, without emitting CFCs. Fundamental technological
change was needed.
The easiest and most straightforward solution would have been to
look for another cleaner, as was done in the examples above. How-
ever, Zytec successfully conceptualized the situation more broadly
than just as a cleaning problem and devised a more innovative and
fundamental solution. It not only developed and implemented a new
flux that left less residue to be cleaned, but they were also eventu-
ally successful in getting their customers and suppliers to embrace
the new approach in contract specifications.83 The result, good
circuit boards with less pollution, was achieved through well-orga-
nized widespread commitment to a new approach.
The development of Low Solids Fluxes (LSF) for soldering
electrical assemblies required several procedural and organizational
modifications. Because of the reduced chemical activity of the
solder flux, it became necessary to pay more attention to improved
soldering practices. These included greater cleanliness of incoming
circuit boards, improved solderability of electronic components,
expanded utilization of first-in-first-out (FIFO) inventory control,
enhanced storage facility temperature/humidity control, and elimi-
nation of potentially harmful packaging materials.
The manufacturing organization was modified by using the
talents of Zytec's Value Analysis (VA) group for technical support
of all soldering operations ....
The visibility of the VA group increased as they became more
involved with performing soldering process-optimization experi-
ments, interacting with suppliers and customers, and providing
documentation for publication ....
Value Analysis allowed central information gathering for deal-
ing with suppliers, customers, and other interested parties. It soon
proved necessary also to accumulate supplier data for a host of
available solder fluxes, review the information, and propose addi-
tional experiments or production trials.
Each customer presented unique requirements for quality, reli-
ability, appearance, and other final product performance parame-
ters. VA correlated customer specifications with available perfor-
mance data. Finally, the VA group assisted in publicizing Zytec's
efforts by:
83. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
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- publishing technical papers,
- making presentations at appropriate conferences,
- assisting with media announcements and articles,
- making presentations to customer groups, and
- conducting tours.84
The project was a success and all customers approved the use of
the new processes. In addition to meeting the company's "zero
use" goal for CFCs, the project lowered costs, improved product
quality, and reduced water and electricity usage.8
This example shows even more clearly what pollution preven-
tion can do, and also the depth of technological change and orga-
nizational adaptation that may be required to achieve it. The
company made basic technological changes in its manufacturing
processes, necessitating managerial and operational changes.
Customer approval and education was essential and required
substantial effort. Several different units of the company eventu-
ally became involved, including top management. There were
quite substantial business risks if the new process had not worked
well and potentially disastrous business consequences if custom-
ers had not been willing to accept the change. A great deal was
required of the company, but a quite substantial environmental
gain resulted.
4. Beyond Zytec - Supplier and Consumer Pollution
Prevention
Zytec's involvement with its customers also shows how, in
addition to supporting innovation in a business's own operations,
pollution prevention efforts can extend to suppliers and custom-
ers. S.C. Johnson Wax reports an outreach effort to encourage
source reduction and recycling efforts among its suppliers, and
initial reactions have been positive.86 Dow Chemical reports on-
going efforts to promote responsible use and disposal of its prod-
ucts, with substantial technical assistance to encourage pollution
84. Id. at 27-28.
85. Id. at 28-29. The project also simplified processes and enabled better use
of factory floor space. All information about the project is taken from the
company's case history statement. Id. at 26.
86. Id. at 170-71.
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prevention among its customers." Smith & Hawken, a small
direct-sales retailer of gardening supplies and lawn furniture,
eventually had to change suppliers to ensure that the furniture it
was selling was made from tropical woods that had been respon-
sibly harvested as part of a sustainable development effort." The
1993 Benchmarking Study of six facilities notes that, in these
effective prevention programs, suppliers and customers are also
used as a source of prevention ideas. 9
Efforts to encourage pollution prevention by a company's cus-
tomers can be particularly effective when the seller's knowledge
of the technology related to the product's use is much greater
than the buyer's knowledge. For example, consider two electric
utilities, Southern California Edison ("SCE") and Pacific Gas and
Electric Company ("PG & E"). Both have reported substantial
efforts to help their customers use less electricity, and thus help
themselves to reduce the pollution that generating this electricity
would entail."
The companies' efforts center on developing new technology
and applications and then educating customers to encourage their
adoption. Rather than encouraging customers to sacrifice by set-
tling for less, new technology is aimed at achieving the same or
87. Id. at 174-76. Bank of America reports that it is developing a commercial
credit policy to "weigh the degree of environmental responsibility displayed by
potential borrowers and their affiliates as a significant part of our decision on
whether or not to grant credit." Id. at 172-73. The policy does not specify pollu-
tion prevention as the desired environmental performance. The substantial diffi-
culties in applying such a policy are noted and discussed. Id.
88. CHANGING COURSE, supra note 20, at 285-89. Jacqueline Cramer & Johan
Schot, Environmental Comakership Among Firms as a Cornerstone in the Striv-
ing for Sustainable Development, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUS-
TRY, supra note 1, at 311, report on the results of two Dutch studies. There is
substantial, although ad hoc, information exchange on environmental issues in
supplier-customer relations now, and they predict that this will grow and that
there will be much more substantial joint efforts aimed at environmental improve-
ment through product requirements and product design and life cycle analysis. Id.
at 316.
89. BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 28, at 11, 32. Other parts of the busi-
ness were an even more frequent source of ideas. Id. at 32.
90. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 47-52. Both companies have addi-
tional pollution prevention efforts as well.
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better results for customers than the previous technology did.
Efforts are aimed at both businesses and individual consumers. At
first blush, it may seem irrational for a company to encourage its
customers to buy less from it. However, in each case, utility
regulators have set rates and other incentives to make the con-
servation programs profitable if they are successful.9' The result
should be both less pollution as a result of less electric power
generation, and lower costs to customers from the savings (al-
though purchasing the new technology will surely entail increased
costs initially).
Extending pollution prevention efforts to suppliers and custom-
ers can encourage business to reach further and to consider the
environmental impacts of a product's entire life cycle.92 A prod-
uct life cycle analysis considers all of a product's environmental
impacts, from raw materials extraction or creation, through prod-
uct manufacturing, distribution and use, and finally into recycling
91. PG & E has reported substantial savings from these efforts:
1991 CEE [Customer Energy Efficiency] activities throughout PG &
E resulted in savings of about 607 million kilowatt hours (kwh) of
electricity, equal to the annual use of about 100,000 PG & E area
households; 37 million therms of natural gas, equal to the annual use
of 50,000 PG & E area households, and offset the need for 119 mw
[megawatts] of electric generating capacity, enough to serve an area of
about 120,000 people. These savings come from all groups of custom-
ers and a variety of measures taken in 1991 including lighting effi-
ciency improvements that will save more than 200 million kwh per
year; agricultural programs, including, pump repairs and adjustments,
modem irrigation pipe and greenhouse heating curtains that will save
more than 100 million kwh per year; heating, ventilation and air con-
ditioning that will save more than 70 million kwh per year; high-effi-
ciency refrigerators for home use that will save more than 4.5 million
kwh per year, and industrial process improvements such as more
efficient motors and better boilers that will save more than 40 million
kwh per year.
Id. at 50-51 (quoting PG & E 1991 Annual Report Page).
92. Patricia S. Dillon & Michael S. Baram, Forces Shaping the Development
and Use of Product Stewardship in the Private Sector, in ENVIRONMENTAL
STRATEGmIS FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 329 (reporting on the results of two
American studies with a specific emphasis on technology transfer);
BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 28, at 11, 32.
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or disposal as waste.93 Life cycle analysis is inevitably con-
cerned with product design, as well as with process changes.
However, this analysis is new and difficult. Furthermore, a single
company often does not control the entire life cycle of a particu-
lar product. Because different companies often operate at different
stages of the cycle, businesses must coordinate their efforts to
achieve responsible product stewardship. In addition to these
cooperative efforts, an industry-wide program such as the Chemi-
cal Manufacturer's Responsible Care program can set standards
and encourage better stewardship.94
B. Redesigning Products and Product Life Cycle Analysis
Product design, or redesign, offers great opportunities for im-
proving environmental technology and preventing pollution. The
importance of product design cannot be overstated: the National
Research Council estimated that it determines seventy percent of
the total cost of a product's development, manufacture, and
use.95 While product design has great potential for effective pol-
lution prevention efforts which a company can make, these efforts
are also likely to be the most expensive and challenging. For
example, customer acceptance, critical to marketplace success,
can be dramatically influenced by product redesign, whether the
customers are individual consumers or large organizations buying
according to predetermined specifications.96 Product design also
presents a particularly attractive target for pollution prevention
and environmental technology policy because it is a constant,
ongoing part of normal business activity, irrespective of environ-
mental considerations. The Organization for Economic Co-opera-
tion & Development ("OECD") reports that "if present trends
continue, 50 percent of the products that will be used in 15 years'
time do not yet exist."'97 Thus, today's product design decisions
93. See infra Part II.B.
94. Dillon & Baram, supra note 92, at 335.
95. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GREEN PRODUCTS
BY DESIGN: CHOICES FOR A CLEANER ENVIRONMENT 35 (OTA-E-541, 1992)
[hereinafter GREEN PRODUCTS BY DESIGN].
96. Id. at 93-97.
97. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation & Development (OECD), THE
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will have an enormous impact on tomorrow's environment. Busi-
ness can make a greater positive impact by incorporating envi-
ronmental considerations into ongoing product design activities.
The ultimate goal of prevention is to design products that require
or are compatible with clean technology, in contrast to product
design that depends on the existing cleaning technology frequent-
ly employed today.9" While pollution control only treats the
symptom, design for the environment can eventually treat the
cause - the creation of pollution. Ignoring environmental impli-.
cations of design can have substantial implications for both envi-
ronmental and monetary costs in both the short and long run."9
Product design traditionally considers a number of variables
that must be accounted for in the final design. This is called de-
sign for X ("DFX"), in which X may be one of a number of
variables, downstream from the design process, that must be
considered."° The goal of pollution prevention is to incorporate
environniental protection factors into product design-to add one
other factor to the X group. The result is design for the environ-
ment ("DFE").
DFE will not be easy to learn because it requires product de-
signers to make new analyses that consider unfamiliar factors.
However, in adding one more element to an existing and familiar
conceptual methodology, DFE should prove possible to learn and
implement over time.' The EPA has established a DFE promo-
tional program that establishes partnerships with industry to pro-
mote environmentally friendly design. 2
STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Paris, 1991), quoted in CHANGING COURSE, supra
note 20, at 98.
98. Ren6 Kemp, An Economic Analysis of Cleaner Technology: Theory and
Evidence, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 79;
Braden R. Allenby, Integrating Environment and Technology: Design for Envi-
ronment, in THE GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 1, at 137.
99. Robert C. Pfahl, Jr., Design for Environment: An R&D Manager's Per-
spective, in THE GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 1, at 208
(discussing three cases studies that amplify this point). See Kathleen Dechant &
Barbara Altman, Environmental Leadership: From Compliance to Competitive
Advantage, 8 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE 7 (1994).
100. Allenby, supra note 98, at 139-41.
101. For a clear and practical review of the techniques for implementing design
for the environment, see id. at 141-47.
102. OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND EVALUATION, EPA, SUSTAINABLE
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Environmentally friendly design can be usefully subdivided by
recognizing two different, although related, goals: design for
waste prevention, and design for better materials manage-
ment." 3 The objective of the first goal, design for waste preven-
tion, is to reduce waste over the product's entire life cycle. Of
course, considering the entire life cycle is difficult because a
particular product may generate waste at many different points
during the cycle."° Thus, the analysis must consider waste re-
sulting from raw materials, product manufacture, distribution, use,
and disposal, as well as the associated packaging waste.0 5
Evaluating these additional factors is both important and com-
plex, as illustrated by designing for product life extension. Longer
product lives have the potential for obvious environmental bene-
fits - they reduce the waste needed to produce replacements.
However, they may also delay introduction of cleaner products,
such as new, more environmentally friendly cars."° Careful
analysis of specific situations is essential. Design for energy
efficiency is also very important because energy production most
often involves some resulting waste.
One of the success stories of waste minimization product rede-
sign is the removal of phosphates from household detergents. In
INDUSTRY: PROMOTING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE INDUS-
TRIAL SECTOR (June 1994) available in LEXIS, ELI Library, File No. AD-426.
103. GREEN PRODUCTS BY DESIGN, supra note 95, at 37-43.
104. Id. at 60-61 (discussing the difficulties of implementing a full life cycle
analysis). In addition to problems of tracing all of a product's upstream and
downstream life cycle impacts, there are conceptual problems in weighing the
environmental significance of these impacts, and the data requirements can
swamp the entire analysis. Despite these problems, a limited life-cycle analysis is
a useful environmental product design strategy because it at least asks the right
questions and uses the answers available. The answers should become better over
time, with further research.
Allenby favors a gradualist approach, designing for only some environmen-
tal factors and then gradually expanding the list, because it offers the opportunity
to learn by doing. See Allenby, supra note 98, at 137.
105. According to Allen Aspengren of 3M, the company must be concerned
with the challenging question, "What waste are we creating for our customers?"
CHANGING COURSE, supra note 20, at 110.
106. This point is made by Rolf Buchheim of VW in discussing the environ-
mental life cycle impacts of cars. Id. at 306.
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Europe, the efforts of Henkel, the German consumer products and
specialty chemicals company, clearly show that gains are possi-
ble, but also that substantial efforts are required. 7 While phos-
phates do improve the performance of cleaning products, they
also contribute to substantial water pollution problems. The
phosphates are fertilizers, and excessive levels can promote algae
growth which can lead to eutrophication of water bodies. 8
After developing new phosphate-free detergents, Henkel faced
the substantial challenge of persuading consumers that these
cleansers worked just as well. Despite initial resistance, the com-
pany persevered and, for a while, marketed both regular and
phosphate-free formulations of its leading detergents. Consumers
were eventually persuaded that the phosphate-free formulation
was just as good a cleanser and better for the environment. The
gradual but widespread movement of consumers toward more
environmentally friendly products supported the change, and
Henkel was eventually rewarded with an increase in market share
as well as positive public relations benefits. This success ulti-
mately moved the entire market in this direction:
Due to overwhelming consumer acceptance of the new Persil [the
phosphate-free formulation], all Henkel's major competitors
launched phosphate-free detergents within a few months....
Nonphosphate powder detergents now have a 100-percent market
share in Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Switzerland. The same situation applies in Japan, while in the
United States, Congress has proposed legislation that would re-
quire all detergents sold there to be phosphate-free by 1996.' 9
107. Id. at 297-301.
108. Id. at 297.
109. Id. at 299-300. "Earlier versions of clean lakes legislation provided for a
phase out of phosphates in household laundry detergents. In the past several
years, there have been dramatic declines in the volume of phosphates in house-
hold laundry detergents and recent actions by major manufacturers will reduce
phosphate use even more." Id.
Congress recognized this movement in 1994. "In response to this new evi-
dence, the [Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1994] does not require
a phase out of phosphate in household laundry detergents, but does direct EPA to
evaluate alternatives to phosphates in nonlaundry and industrial detergent prod-
ucts and make recommendations to Congress concerning appropriate actions."
Water Pollution Control Act of 1994, S. REP. No. 257 (to accompany S. 2093)
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This success, however, did not come without effort. Product
redesign requires fundamental changes in the business and its
relationships with customers. Research to develop the new prod-
ucts took over a decade and over 200 people were involved at the
height of the project. Finally, success came slowly: consumer
testing began in 1976, and the eventual market triumph did not
occur until 1991.110
Life-cycle analysis in the design stage leads to a broader, lon-
ger term view, with the potential to realize pollution prevention
opportunities over the entire production-consumption-disposal
cycle. The analysis considers the product's resource requirements
and other environmental implications. Proctor & Gamble, the
American consumer products multinational, has developed and
applied a partial life-cycle analysis in reducing the ultimate pack-
aging waste from several of its products."' For example, a
study it commissioned on the packaging of its Downy fabric
conditioner (marketed as Lenor in Europe) considered seven
different packaging systems. Surprisingly, the study concluded
that recycling and reuse of the current polyethylene plastic bottles
offered only minimal environmental benefits because of the in-
creased wastewater that resulted from washing the bottles."'
The study found that packaging the product in paperboard cartons
and soft pouches, and selling it in a concentrated triple strength
formulation promoted for its environmental friendliness could
achieve a ninety-five percent waste reduction."3 While the con-
centrated version had been available in the United States years
before, it had not been successful. With consumer education and
increased environmental awareness, its renewed attempt to market
the concentrated detergent fared much better. "In less than a year,
the [triple strength paperboard] refill had taken nearly 40 percent
(May 10, 1994).
110. CHANGING COURSE, supra note 20, at 298-300.
111. Id. at 290-94.
112. Also, effective recycling required consumer commitment, existence of
efficient local recycling programs, and the existence of viable end-use markets.
However, as recycling is increasingly pursued in the United States and elsewhere,
these conditions will present less of an obstacle. Id.
113. Id.
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of Downy sales in the United States. The response to concentrat-
ed products in Europe [in soft pouches] has been equally
strong."'"14
By carefully considering waste reduction in product and pack-
aging design and selection decisions, real environmental gains are
possible. However, substantial investments of time and resources
are typically needed. Because environmental gains can only be
realized from greener products that consumers or other users
actually buy, customer acceptance is crucial. Of course, increas-
ingly green consumers may well provide at least some of their
own momentum toward greener products.
The design examples considered thus far have all been con-
cerned with waste management issues, rather than with design for
materials management. A product's intrinsic characteristics often
determine whether waste management or materials management is
the most important environmental design concern. Design for bet-
ter waste management is particularly important for products
which are "low design/high-material items, such as packaging,
consumer personal care items (e.g., soaps and shampoos), and
bulk chemicals .. ..""' With these types of products, materials
(except for their packaging) tend to be depleted during consump-
tion rather than discarded.
In contrast, the design of products that incorporate many differ-
ent materials creates a greater environmental concern.
Associated upstream and downstream product and manufacturing
process implications of changes to such a product or its associated
manufacturing systems make the analysis far more complex than
114. Id. at 293-94. The Swiss grocery and retail chain, Migros, has also had
success in implementing a partial life-cycle analysis. The system assigns negative
"eco-points" for each negative environmental impact, and product and packaging
decisions are then based on the best score in "eco-points." For example, conven-
tional tin coffee containers earn 98 negative eco-points while the alternative alu-
minum coated paper container earned only 12, making the choice for the alumi-
num system a simple one. Product managers are also given a target of eco-points
they are not to exceed in product selection decisions, thereby sending a clear
message of the company's values and priorities throughout the management hier-
archy. Id. at 294-96.
115. See Allenby, supra note 98, at 138 (explaining this distinction in more
detail).
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in the case of low-design/high-material items. Moreover, the sup-
plier/customer networks for high-design/low-material products tend
to be far more complex than those for low-design/high-material
products.6
Automobiles, electronic and communications equipment, and
airplanes are all examples of "high-design/low-material prod-
uctS."
' 7
The prime prevention issue with complex products is thus
design for materials management, which is the second group of
design related environmental impacts. Once again, the product's
entire life cycle should be considered to the extent this is possi-
ble. Environmental issues, however, direct attention to a different
group of design questions concerning materials management
issues:
Examples of design for better materials management include mak-
ing products that can be remanufactured, recycled, composted, or
safely incinerated with energy recovery. Broadly speaking, these
management options are listed in order of preference, both from a
business perspective and an environmental perspective. One model
of plastics management, for instance, envisions a life cycle in
which virgin plastic components are reused as long as possible,
then the materials are repeatedly recycled through lower and lower
value-added applications until the plastic is finally incinerated to
recover the chemical energy.'.18
Environmentally sensitive product design for complex products
starts by focusing on the product and its environmental attributes,
"within the constraints of the existing production/consumption
network."" 9
Although product design begins with a product-centered ap-
proach, the eventual goal is to create a systems-oriented approach
by extending the frame of reference to the whole produc-
tion/consumption network.
The first option [product focus] is easiest, since it can be accom-
plished within the context of an individual firm. The second
116. Id. at 139.
117. Id. at 138.
118. GREEN PRODUCTS BY DESIGN, supra note 95, at 40. This model of plas-
tics management was proposed by GE Plastics, Pittsfield, Mass. Id. at 40, n.20.
119. Id. at 53.
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[systems focus] is more ambitious, because it implies a new way
of looking at products, and may require new patterns of industrial
organization, such as the formation of cooperative relationships
among suppliers, manufacturers, and waste management provid-
ers.120
1. AT&T
AT&T's ongoing efforts to design and make a greener tele-
phone illustrate the potential, and the problems, of design for the
environment with a complex, high-design/low-materials prod-
uct.' First, the project had to define what was environmentally
preferable for stages of design, manufacture, use, and disposal.
Green design required the consideration of a number of factors,
including: using materials that were reusable or recyclable, identi-
fying materials (especially plastics) to ease recycling, employing
alternative methods of holding the product together that would
ease disassembly, as well as utilizing adhesives, pigments, and
flame retardants.12 Manufacturing not only generates inherent
waste streams and materials reuse questions, but it also presents
environmental questions related to the packaging of components
assembled into the telephone. Use of the telephone did not pres-
ent many critical environmental issues: its use consumes minimal
amounts of energy, and in many situations may well substitute for
more energy intensive transportation. However, the telephone's
end-of-life phase presented many environmental questions, and
much work on them continues. Materials recycling is one very
important and complex issue. In addition, AT&T has the infra-
structure for reconditioning whole telephones for reuse, a legacy
of its days as a regulated monopoly supplier that leased rather
than sold telephones.'23 Ultimately the project must also evalu-
ate the environmental merits of leased rather than purchased tele-
phones, although the company's policy "must be economical to
120. Id.
121. Janine C. Sekutowski, Greening the Telephone: A Case Study, in THE
GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 1, at 171.




support the reality of being in an unregulated, highly competitive
business."'' 4 The product's complexity makes "greening the
telephone" a difficult design process, but one in which progress is
being made.
2. Volkswagen
Volkswagen's efforts at recycling more of the parts of its
scrapped cars offer a second instructive example.'25 Seventy-
five percent of the weight of a car is steel, most of which is
already recycled. Yet, prompted by both its environmental values
and the threat of stricter regulation, Volkswagen has initiated a
program to reach most or all of the remaining twenty-five per-
cent. Plastics present the greatest challenge, and one that will
only increase as they find greater use in new cars. In 1990,
Volkswagen began operating a pilot recycling plant in Leer, Ger-
many, to learn more about the processes and problems:
At Leer, each car goes through a careful dismantling process,
separating the various waste streams. First, all oils and other liq-
uids are drained off; the company quickly realized that items such
as closed gear boxes hampered this process. Batteries are removed
so that the metals, plastics, and acid can be recovered. Plastic parts
are removed, reground, and then transported to suppliers. Catalytic
converters, which contain valuable precious metals, are also sepa-
rated and processed. Finally, after the glass and rubber have been
extracted, the remainder is shredded for use in the steel indus-
try ....
VW's experience at Leer has shown that no longer is the cost of
production the sole consideration in design and materials choices;
"the costs of reuse must also be included" says Buchheim [VW's
manager of research and development]. This means reassessing
existing designs and materials. Some broad lessons have already
been learned. Simplification is a great aid to recycling. All major
plastic parts are now marked for easy recognition during disassem-
bly; clips are favored instead of screws, and the number of differ-
ent components and materials used for a particular module of the
car is minimized where possible. There have already been some
design improvements; for example, the fuel tank of the old Golf
124. Id. at 176.
125. CHANGING COURSE, supra note 20, at 305-308.
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model had 32 different parts, made from several different types of
plastics. The fuel tank for the new Golf model contains only 16
parts in an integrated design. Disassembly time has been cut from
seven to three minutes. Even small parts like engine bearings have
been redesigned to facilitate recycling.
In addition to better design, VW hopes to improve its recycling
rate through choosing materials that can operate within a closed-
loop system. Materials recyclability is now included as one of thedesign goals for each new model at VW, and "as a matter of prin-
ciple, new materials are only given the go-ahead for full scale
production if they are integrated in a self-contained recycling con-
cept." 126
A number of other automobile companies and their suppliers
have recycling efforts underway. 7 The efforts are quite varied,
although all seek ways to avoid the waste from the disposal of
cars, and most companies have implemented pilot projects to gain
firsthand knowledge. These efforts rely on extensive networking
with suppliers and others, as well as developing and implement-
ing of existing technologies. One radical technological alternative
is Mercedes-Benz' experiment with a "melt reactor" process to
extract raw materials from the automobile hulk without shred-
ding." While much is yet to be learned, three central factors
account for the companies' differences in strategies. First, the
companies' different market positions create different economies
of scale and scope for the collection, processing, or recycling op-
tions in particular situations. Second, the differences in strategies
of rebuilding some parts for resale reflect different market values
of the rebuilt parts from different manufacturers. Third, the com-
panies are subject to the varied demands of different national
126. Id. at 307-08. See also Richard L. Klimisch, Designing the Modern Auto-
mobile for Recycling, in THE GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note
1, at 165 (discussing the recycling of cars). Klimisch notes that the tradeoffs in
environmental consequences of alternative designs are hard to measure. Id. at
169. The piece does not discuss the possibility of redesigning the process to make
plastics separation easier, indicating that burning them for their energy value may
be a superior solution.
127. See generally, Frank den Hond & Peter Groenewegen, Solving the Auto-
mobile Shredder Waste Problem: Cooperation Among Firms in the Automotive
Industry, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 343.
128. Id. at 353.
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governments, which creates diverse pressures for more environ-
mentally friendly design.'29
There is a substantial and growing body of evidence that op-
portunities for pollution prevention abound. 3 Of course, most
of the evidence is either individual or collections of case studies,
rather than broadly gauged studies that measure across the whole
economy. In addition, much of the information originates from
the companies, who are less likely to publish business literature
about any unsuccessful efforts.
Despite these qualifications, the available information indicates
that real opportunities are widespread. The success stories involve
two critical components. First, pollution prevention requires a
creative effort - the innovative spark - to find new ways of
doing things. Because innovation is so essential, pollution preven-
tion efforts are varied and diverse, as are the motives for under-
taking them. Any serious pollution prevention policy must em-
brace and build on this diversity. Second, pollution prevention
also requires the company to invest time and resources to bring
this creative spark to full flame. Innovation alone is not enough;
there must also be an organizational commitment to pollution
prevention and an organizational structure capable of supporting
it.
III. COMPANY PROGRAMS AND POLIcIES To SUPPORT
PREVENTION
A. Successful Programs and Corporate Culture
Pollution prevention, and adopting the requisite new environ-
mental technology, requires changing the behavior of people
within business organizations, and this necessarily depends on the
organization's programs, structure, values, and innovative and
creative insights. First, the organization must foster an atmo-
sphere that is conducive to creative thinking. Second, the organi-
zation must support innovative ideas and develop, evaluate, and
hopefully implement them with human, financial, and technologi-
129. Id. at 362.
130. See supra notes 1, 20, for a survey of sources discussing pollution preven-
tion case studies.
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cal resources. As leading companies increasingly see the value of
pollution prevention and environmental technology efforts, their
supporting policies are becoming formal, organized, and highly
developed. 3' The following two examples illustrate the most
ambitious and developed of these efforts, and this section will
discuss the general lessons that have been learned.
3-M is well-known for its pollution prevention and environ-
mental technology efforts and it is often cited as a paradigm
example. It's 3P program - Pollution Prevention Pays - dates
from 1975 and was certainly one of the first such efforts.'32 The
program is based on the premise that pollution is a wasteful,
inefficient use of resources, so that preventing it is good business.
The program is a voluntary effort to motivate employees to find,
promote, and implement ways to eliminate pollution before it is
created. Any employee or group of employees can identify a need
and develop a project. To be recognized as an approved 3P pro-
ject, the proposal must meet four criteria.' It must (1) reduce
pollution through product or process change, or other prevention
means, (2) reduce energy or raw materials usage, or improve
natural resource use, (3) involve a technical innovation, and (4)
offer monetary benefit through reduced costs, including environ-
mental compliance costs, or increased sales. 33
131. Dechant & Altman, supra note 99, at 9.
132. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 12-17. See also Masters of Inno-
vation: How 3M Keeps its New Products Coming, BusINEss WEEK, Apr. 10,
1989, at 58. The acclaim is, however, not universal; for a brief, critical evaluation
of 3M's overall environmental performance, see Jim Donahue, Mischief Mis-
deeds and Mendacity: The Real 3M, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, May 1991, at
29.
133. The case history quotes 3M policy concerning the qualifications of a
proposal for a 3P project:
-It must, through process change, product reformulation, or other
preventive means, eliminate or reduce a pollutant that currently is a
problem or has the potential to become a problem in the future.
-It should exhibit, in addition to reduced pollution, environmental
benefit through reduction in energy consumption, more efficient use of
raw materials, or improvement in the use of other natural resources.
-It should involve a technical accomplishment, innovative approach,
or unique design.
-It must have some monetary benefit for 3M. This may be through
PREVENTING POLLUTION
The vice president of the Environmental Engineering and Pollu-
tion Control ("EEPC") staff group is responsible for 3P. The
members of this group assist individual operating units. Approval
and funding of specific projects is usually within individual oper-
ating units. In 1992 3M reported that, since 1975, more than
3,000 approved projects have prevented more than 575,000 tons
of pollution and saved the company more than $530 million.'34
In accordance with company policy, 3M does not profit from air
emission credits earned by its programs, these credits are general-
ly returned to environmental agencies.
Building on this record of solid success, 3M expanded the 3P+
program in 1989. The goals of this effort are, by the year 2000,
to make a ninety percent reduction in all non-hazardous releases
and to reduce all waste by fifty percent. "Beyond the year 2000,
3M's goal is to come as close to zero emissions as is technically
possible."'35 This new program combines the efforts of a central
pollution prevention staff in the EEPC Department with those of
new waste minimization teams within every operating division to
identify source reduction and recycling opportunities. 36 This
summary is taken from the company case history, and thus it
reflects enthusiasm for promotion of the program's successes.
However, even with this qualification, the record of real
achievement is clear and commendable.
Dow Corporation's Waste Reduction Always Pays ("WRAP")
program is another success story, although a more recent one.'37
Begun in 1986, the program aims to control costs and improve
public image by preventing the production of wastes rather than
treating them at the end of the pipe. The program is overseen by
a senior management committee, with a WRAP coordinator in
reduced or deferred pollution control or manufacturing costs, increased
sales of an existing or new product, or other reduction in capital re-
quirements or expenses.
BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 13.
134. Id. at 14.
135. Id. at 15. Challenge '95 is a new corporate productivity program that sets
interim goals for reduced waste generation and energy use by 1995. These goals
will be in addition to the 50% energy use reduction accomplished since 1975. Id.
136. Id. at 15-16.
137. See CHANGING COURSE, supra note 20, at 265-70.
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each of Dow's five operating divisions in the United States. Ev-
ery plant develops an index of pounds of waste per unit of pro-
duction, and these are regularly reviewed and evaluated. Employ-
ee participation provides the creative spark:
employees are encouraged to seek out waste reduction projects and
are appropriately rewarded for their efforts through personal rec-
ognition from peers and management.... A major goal of the
WRAP program is to broaden the thinking of employees so that
they look beyond individual plant boundaries and understand the
total environmental impact of their chemical processes. They must
never assume that some other part of the organization will handle
their waste streams."'
The program's accomplishments are impressive. Reductions in
materials lost, transportation and disposal costs, and emissions
have been achieved. By 1992, air emissions in the United States
had been cut in half since 1985 and less than one percent of
Dow's hazardous waste went to a landfill. 3 9 Dow has also been
a primary participant in voluntary government efforts to reduce
emissions of toxins, particularly the 33/50 program.' " Dow's
WRAP program is generally judged a success, both for its specif-
ic pollution prevention accomplishments, and its support of
changing employee's attitudes about pollution prevention.
Some general conclusions are possible from these and other
company programs. 4' First, the chief executive officer must
show clear and demonstrable support of the project with a clear
expression of commitment to a corporate environmental policy. In
Chevron's case, for example, this took the form of Chevron
Chairman George Keller's 1987 speech that called for corporate
138. Id. at 267.
139. Evaluation figures are presumably supplied by the company, as no inde-
pendent sources are cited. See id. at 266-67. See also BEYOND COMPLIANCE,
supra note 1, at 17 (discussing the program favorably).
140. CHANGING COURSE, supra note 20, at 268.
141. See BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 104 (offering several more
useful case studies). See also Dechant & Altman, supra note 99, at 9-15 (survey-
ing a number of successful programs and presenting a general analysis of the
important characteristics); Dillon, supra note 37, at 203-05 (presenting an excel-
lent discussion. of the important organizational requirements for a successful
prevention program).
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environmental policy to move beyond compliance, in which he
said:
Today, we are in a very real sense a society of environmentalists.
We all want clean water and pure air and wilderness and wild-
life .... At Chevron, we're very proud of a corporate environmen-
tal policy that says we comply fully with the letter and spirit of all
laws affecting our operation. But as long as our environmental
philosophy is framed by the concept of compliance, we won't get
much credit for our positive actions. Compliance means that the
moral initiative lies elsewhere - outside of industry. 2
Senior company management sets the tone and establishes the
real goals of a business organization for all the successful pro-
grams. Further, the commitment of senior company management
is essential to a meaningful pollution prevention policy.'43
Second, successful programs must be structured to establish the
importance of pollution prevention at the corporate level, and to
preserve initiative at the plant level. To emphasize its importance,
prevention must become the day-to-day responsibility of a high
level, respected company management official. Many of the offi-
cials chosen to head the effort are top level company vice presi-
dents with long company service; typically, they report directly to
the chief executive officer.'" Using such high-level personnel
sends the entire organization a clear message about the impor-
tance of prevention. However, the management role, while
crucial, must not become too intrusive. A 1993 study of six suc-
142. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 102. See also id. at 98 (similar
"Monsanto Pledge" announced by Chairman and CEO Richard Mahoney on Jan.
30, 1990).
143. Dillon, supra note 37, at 201. See also Dechant & Altman, supra note
99, at 9-10 (discussing the importance of a mission statement that clearly articu-
lates corporate environmental values); BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 28, at
2, 12 (noting the importance of support for the program at the corporate level).
Thomas N. Gladwin, The Meaning of Greening: A Plea for Organizational
Theory, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 37, 52-
54, discusses environmental problems as an opportunity for "transformative lead-
ership" by corporate management, revising the organization's paradigm view of
environmental compliance and optimal performance.
144. For example, Nicholas L. Reding is Executive Vice President for Environ-
ment, Safety, Health and Manufacturing of Monsanto. BEYOND COMPLIANCE,
supra note 1, at 140. See generally, id. at 97-120.
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cessful facility level programs concludes that the most effective
management roles were to establish goals, to support pollution
prevention technology development and facilitate its transfer
across the company, and to forecast upcoming compliance
issues."4 Finding the right balance to preserve local flexibility
and initiative was equally important: "Facilities were successful
when they were not told how to approach pollution prevention.
The freedom to choose the best method to reach pollution pre-
vention goals was key to their success."'"
Within each facility, leadership and support are equally impor-
tant. The 1992 study of source reduction programs in twenty-
three chemical industry plants found that, where a management
level employee had responsibility for the program, the number of
projects more than doubled, and this increase was statistically sig-
nificant. 47 Successful programs demonstrated management com-
mitment, both in giving employees the time and resources to do
the job, as well as by direct participation by management in the
program itself. "
In addition to management support, successful programs typi-
cally use teams that cut across company functional lines and
departments. Conceiving, developing, and implementing preven-
tion programs will require considering a diverse array of ques-
tions including environmental regulatory, legal, technical, engi-
neering, financing, and marketing issues. Cross-functional teams
or some other integrating mechanism, geared to the company's
specific business, market, and internal operating culture, will be
essential.'49 Interestingly, despite this need for diverse expertise,
145. BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 28, at 3.
146. Id. at 6.
147. DORFMAN ET" AL., supra note 63, at 31-32. The management officials
were either the plant's manager or its environmental officer. Similarly, the 1993
study found that, at four of the six successful programs studied, either the plant
manager or the environmental management staff was held accountable for pollu-
tion prevention. BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 28, at 27.
148. BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 28, at 20.
149. Id. at 23; Dillon, supra note 37, at 201. See also Dechant & Altman,
supra note 99, at 10-12 (discussing the need for such a framework and surveying
several examples of programs); Friedlander, supra note 37, at 180 (arguing that
prevention must ultimately be incorporated into engineering design to be effec-
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the 1993 Benchmarking Study found that none of the six success-
ful programs studied used outside consultants for the program or
specific projects. 5 While each firm had the necessary expertise
for pollution prevention, end-of-the-pipe compliance efforts often
required the use of outside consultants to supplement the firm's
expertise.
The 1992 Inform study of twenty-nine chemical plants offers
some substantial evidence that a structured program at the plant
level enhances the prospects for success."' This study evaluated
the source reduction program at each of the plants based on eight
different criteria. 52 While none of the programs included all
eight elements, the fourteen plants that adopted half or more of
them had, on average, two and a half times as many source re-
duction projects as those that did not.'53 Thus, the more struc-
tured plant level programs had greater source reduction success.
The organizational structures employed vary from Monsanto's
new Environmental Policy Committee to Chevron's less formal
study teams.'54 However, regardless of the details, an ongoing,
structured program is required. Unlike the programs discussed
above, the more typical pollution prevention effort is ad hoc and
episodic.'55 Section II above reviewed the variety of prevention
efforts, from straightforward housekeeping, through process
changes, up to product redesign. As specific prevention projects
become increasingly ambitious, they will require the long-term,
continuing support of an organizational structure and commitment
of resources to be effective.
The third characteristic of successful programs is that they
enlist the support and initiative of widespread rank and file em-
tive). Such incorporation requires cross-functional connections within the organi-
zation. Id.
150. BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 28, at 12.
151. DORFMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 30.
152. The factors were (1) a written source reduction policy, (2) materials ac-
counting, (3) materials balance, (4) cost accounting, (5) leadership, (6) employee
involvement, (7) environmental goals, (8) environmental program. See id. at 29.
153. See id. at 28.
154. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 100, 102.
155. See Dillon, supra note 37. The tendency of firms to focus on ad hoc, end-
of-the-pipe control technology is discussed supra, Part II.A.
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ployees and provide rewards for outstanding contributors.'56 The
same 1992 study of source reduction programs at twenty-nine
chemical industry plants found that the number of projects more
than doubled with employee involvement, a statistically signifi-
cant increase.'57 Many specific pollution prevention ideas must
come from rank and file employees, whose cooperation and sup-
port is required for a successful implementation. Ideas and sup-
port will be forthcoming only if they are encouraged, recognized
and rewarded within the organization. Pollution prevention has
not been a traditional value and way of doing things for most
plants. To change these internal values and procedures requires
recruiting employees throughout the organization and involving
them in the program. Fortunately, these may prove easy since
many employees are also concerned about the environment.
Fourth, successful programs relate pollution prevention to other
values traditionally stressed by the corporation. For example, Xe-
rox related its prevention effort to its traditional preoccupation
with quality to establish the importance of environmental protec-
tion.158 Further, all the programs stress the relationship of pollu-
tion prevention to long term competitiveness and profitability.
Pollution prevention means less waste, more production, and
often innovative solutions to other problems at the same time.
The 1993 Benchmarking Study concluded that prevention pro-
grams were only sustainable if most of the projects undertaken
pursuant to them were cost effective.5 9 3M's theory is that all
manufacturing operations should be rethought and redesigned
regularly to enhance competitiveness. 6" The employee innova-
tion that pollution prevention programs demand and support will
156. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 101, 105; BENCHMARKING STUDY,
supra note 28, at 9.
157. DORFMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 31.
158. Chevron's program was related to its traditional emphasis on protecting
health and safety. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 101-04. See Dillon,
supra note 37, at 205; Dechant & Altman, supra note 99, at 10-12;
BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 28, at 26.
159. See BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note 28, at 24. Four of the six pro-
grams studied required prevention projects to compete against other capital im-
provement projects on the basis of return on investment. Id.
160. Id.
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also enhance such a productivity effort.
Finally, the most successful prevention programs look beyond
the boundaries of the company's own operations to consider rela-
tionships with suppliers, customers, and other potential part-
ners.' 61 Considering the environmental performance of suppliers
and customers to evaluate their prevention efforts is a good start.
Beyond this, partnerships with them can lead to joint efforts to
exchange information or technology that improve performance,
using each party's product, process, and environmental
knowledge. 62 With complex products, such as cars, improved
prevention and recycling efforts will mandate cooperative efforts
among suppliers and manufacturers. 63 Of course, looking be-
yond the boundaries of the organization will present an additional
set of challenges, and likely require some additional personnel
and skills for particular projects.
Taken together, these factors show that nothing less than a
change in an organization's culture is needed to establish success-
ful pollution prevention and environmental technology pro-
grams.'" On environmental issues, most corporations have
evolved a "compliance-deterrence" culture, reflecting business'
mindset that merely reacts to the commands of the regulatory sys-
tem. 65 However, such a culture will direct the thinking of all its
161. See id. at 32; supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
162. See Dillon & Baram, supra note 92, at 338-40 (discussing the possibilities
for such efforts to achieve technology transfer over the product life cycle, based
on two American studies); Cramer & Schot, supra note 88, at 319 (discussing in-
formation exchange in supplier-customer relationships, based on two Dutch stud-
ies).
163. den Hond & Groenewegen, supra note 127, at 343; Klimisch, supra note
126, at 167.
164. See Manik Roy, Pollution Prevention, Organizational Culture, and Social
Learning, 22 ENVTL. L. 189 (1991). The successful culture will emphasize orga-
nizational learning as part of the process of technological innovation and pollu-
tion prevention. See David Rejeski, The Forgotten Dimensions of Sustainable
Development: Organizational Learning and Change, 3 CoRP. ENVTL. STRATEGY
19 (Summer 1995).
The 1993 study also noted the opposite effect; successful programs allow
for and adapt to the organization's culture. BENCHMARKING STUDY, supra note
28, at 10.
165. See Strasser, supra note 9, (manuscript at 267) for a survey of the litera-
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participants toward compliance with existing control require-
ments, usually focusing on familiar technology. In so occupying
the minds of the relevant business (and regulatory) actors, the
creative, innovative processes required for pollution prevention
and embracing technological change are overlooked."6
Pollution prevention efforts within business organizations today
are more limited by organizational culture than by available tech-
nology. 67 The processes frequently required for adopting exist-
ing technology, and perhaps even developing new technology, can
only be supported by a different organizational culture. Changing
the organization's culture involves a multilevel process of articu-
lating values and commands, changing structure and personnel,
and rewarding the desired behavior. Most importantly, this type
of change takes time and sustained effort throughout the orga-
nization. While there are many barriers to this innovative effort,
management attitudes and information, and the resulting concep-
tual barriers, are clearly among the most critical ones. 6
One careful study of two prevention programs at different
facilities within the same company, presented as thinly disguised
hypothetical situations, showed the crucial role played by internal
organizational culture and program design at each facility.'69
The programs were each aimed at reducing the amount of waste
ture on the compliance-deterrence culture.
166. Id. (manuscript at 235). Similar changes will also be needed in the organi-
zational culture of regulatory organizations. See id.
167. "In most cases, technology probably will not be the limiting factor, a
lesson learned in recent years as companies have adopted pollution prevention
practices. Rather, cultural and organizational changes within industry (as well as
changes in the behavior of consumers and government agencies) will most likely
present greater obstacles." Dillon, supra note 37, at 202.
168. Ashford, supra note 1, at 292-96, emphasizes the importance of manage-
ment attitudes in implementing pollution prevention (offering a comprehensive
list of barriers to prevention). Dieleman & de Hoo, supra note 39, at 258-65,
discuss the barriers to prevention that the Dutch PRISMA project encountered,
emphasizing the conceptual barriers as key. Dechant & Altman, supra note 99, at
15-18, discuss the importance of managing change and directing human resources
to achieve prevention results.
169. Peter B. Cebon, The Myth of Best Practices: The Context Dependence of
Two High-Performing Waste Reduction Programs, in ENVIRONMENTAL STRATE-
GIES FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 167, 168.
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that required disposal. The more successful program was struc-
tured around a competition among junior engineers to conceive,
design, and implement prevention projects. 7 ' The engineers
were enthusiastic about the program because it would lead to
internal recognition and career advancement, even though no
special monetary compensation was awarded. 7' Their supervi-
sors also supported the program, as good training for the engi-
neers and as a source of additional capital for the operation, as
well as for the general recognition afforded those associated with
successful projects."' I
The second program, while successful to some degree, was not
judged to be as successful as the first.' It focused on machine
operators, rather than engineers, as a result of top management's
current concerns with employee empowerment.' As a result,
the program tended to generate much smaller, less ambitious pro-
jects. "'75 Furthermore, its structure caused it to be seen as a com-
petitor for scarce capital, rather than a source of additional capi-
tal, thus making it less popular with plant management. 76 The
organizational context and program design made it impossible to
replicate the successful first program in the second program,
emphasizing the importance of these organizational dynamics in
general.
The core lesson was that program success depends on the par-
ticular organizational context. Some other general lessons also
emerged:
The data presented here suggest that there are a number of very
important principles that managers must keep in mind when de-
signing programs.... For example, participants need something to
motivate them to participate. However, we cannot say, a priori,
whether that should be a financial reward, a pat on the back, a
veiled promise of promotion, an appeal to the health and welfare
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 175, 184-87.
173. Id. at 171.
174. Id. at 181-84. The second program was implemented several years later
than the first. Id. at 175-77.
175. Id. at 171-72.
176. Id.
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of the community, exhortations from top management, or an op-
portunity for a diversion from routine work.
Another important principle is that a program cannot violate the
territory of the people who supervise the participants. Furthermore,
a good program offers something that will make these people want
to actively support it. It will also offer something to people from
other functional groups.'
While this study focuses on the characteristics that lead to suc-
cess in these two specific programs, in doing so it clarifies the re-
quirements for a program that will generate successful individual
projects. Prevention must be imbedded in the values, the struc-
ture, and the incentive and reward system of the organization, for
parties to make the efforts that it entails."'
B. Accounting Systems and Pollution Prevention
Accounting systems are one aspect of corporate culture that
have quite substantial implications for pollution prevention and
implementing environmental technology. On the surface, account-
ing systems inspire images of numbing detail and mundane reali-
ty that seem to be in sharp contrast to the conceptual expansive-
ness of the corporate culture discussed above. However, account-
ing systems are a very important part of the business
organizations' culture because they provide crucial information
flow and are a part of the organization's language.'79
However, traditional accounting systems are one reason that the
traditional business culture has not been favorably disposed to
pollution prevention and environmental technology. Such technol-
ogy requires investments in specific projects, as well as in the
177. Id. at 193-94.
178. Different parts of the organization's culture provide support for invention,
innovation and diffusion. Prevention often involves diffusion of known
technology and this part of the process should be the focus of much business and
policy activity. See IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION, supra note 46, at 85-
86.
179. Michael Power, Constructing the Responsible Organization: Accounting
and Environmental Representation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL
RESPONSIBILITY 369 (Teubner et al. eds., 1994). This work presents a theoretical
treatment of the role of accounting systems within business organizations.
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organizational program that supports them, as discussed in Part
III.A. In a business context, however, companies make invest-
ments only if they expect a resulting profit. Typically this re-
quires that the project or program demonstrate that it generates a
better return than other competing alternatives. 80 In exceptional
cases, some of the expected return may be in the form of less
immediate and precise benefits, such as improved environmental
performance, even if these cannot be measured with precision.
Whether an investment in pollution prevention and environmental
technology is projected to lead to a positive return largely de-
pends on how the company does the accounting for savings of /
traditional pollution control costs. 8' Unfortunately, in many or-
ganizations today, accounting systems do not account for environ-
mental costs well, often failing to identify them or to allocate
them to the cost creating activity.'82
The goal of accounting systems is to identify costs and allocate
them to the activity that causes them to be incurred. However,
this allocation process is itself often coinplicated and, as a result,
costly. Consequently, imperfect compromises frequently occur.
Furthermore, most accounting systems were created primarily for
financial management and reporting; traditionally, they have not
been very concerned with accurately reflecting environmental
costs. 3 Historically, environmental costs charged to the busi-
180. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, EPA, FACILITY POLLUTION
PREVENTION GUIDE 58 (EPA 600-R-92-088, 1992).
181. Costs, as used here are only the internalized expenditures paid by firms, in
keeping with the focus of this Article. While there may well be environmental
impacts that impose social costs not internalized by the firm, it is unlikely that a
firm will respond to these general social costs until forced to internalize and pay
them. For a general discussion of broader environmental social costs that a gen-
eral analysis would consider, see THE ECONOMICS OF PROJECT APPRAISAL AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (John Weis ed., 1994).
182. See FACILITY POLLUTION PREVENTION GUIDE, supra note 180, at 33.
183. Daryl Ditz et al., Environmental Accounting: An Overview, in GREEN
LEDGERS: CASE STUDIES IN CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING 1, 9
(Daryl Ditz et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter GREEN LEDGERS].
Two similar studies by the Tellus Institute develop these themes and pro-
pose specific policy responses. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS,
EPA, TOTAL COST ASSESSMENT: ACCELERATING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION PRE-
VENTION THROUGH INNOVATIVE PROJECT FINANCIAL ANALYSIS (EPA 741/R-
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ness have not been large, so they have received even less atten-
tion. Thus, conventional accounting systems often overlooked
environmental costs all together, particularly in specific project
appraisal, or treated them as overhead to be allocated
arbitrarily." 4 As a result, the cost saving benefits of specific
pollution prevention and environmental technology projects often
receive little consideration in accounting systems. These effects
are particularly pronounced when the environmental costs and
benefits arise after the product leaves the shop floor, which is
often the case.'85
Many environmental costs are simply never identified as such.
Consider a firm that uses a particular chemical in production. The
accounting system already tracks the purchase of the material. But
the costs associated with its use do not stop there. The costs of
storing the chemical may be higher due to environmental consider-
ations. The company may incur larger costs for treating contami
nated rinse water or managing the resulting sludge. Securing the
necessary permits, monitoring compliance, and subsequent report-
ing also represent real costs. Depending on the nature of the facili-
ty, use of this material might also force the company to-pay for
additional worker training.
The point is that decisions as common as choosing a process
chemical can give rise to various environmental costs that can be
difficult to recognize or quantify. A product designer, purchasing
agent, or product manager might well select one chemical that ap-
pears less costly than another, but that entails higher overall costs
for the firm. The situation is considerably more complicated for
larger firms that manage hundreds of materials at multiple facili-
ties. Most firms have only a rough idea of how much a specific
product or process contributes to facility-wide environmental
costs.
86
92/002, 1992) [hereinafter TOTAL COST ASSESSMENT]; ALLEN L. WHITE ET AL.,
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO THE FINANCIAL EVALUATION OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION PRE-
VENTION INVESTMENTS (1991) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES]. For an
introduction, see Martin A. Spitzer, Calculating the Benefits of Pollution Preven-
tion, in POLLUTION ENGINEERING, Sept. 1, 1992, at 33.
184. Ditz et al., supra note 183, at 9.
185. Rebecca Todd, Zero-Loss Environmental Accounting Systems, in THE
GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 1, at 191.
186. Ditz et al., supra note 183, at 10.
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A recent case study of the Yorktown refinery came to some un-
expected conclusions on their costs.'87 First, the unrecognized
costs were, proportionately, much larger than expected.' For
example, among all costs attributed to environmental issues, the
maintenance costs exceeded wastewater treatment costs, although
maintenance had never been considered to be an environmental
cost before. 9 Overall, environmental costs were much higher
than expected once they were more accurately identified."9 Pre-
vious estimates were that environmental costs would be three per-
cent of operating costs; after a six month study and reallocation,
they were calculated to be twenty-two percent. 9'
Environmental costs will not be well managed where account-
ing systems do not identify and allocate them to the business
activities that cause them. Indeed, managers may be unaware of
their environmental costs, or what decisions have led to them.
Even when aware of them as general overhead, individual man-
agers have little accountability for them and hence little incentive
to reduce or eliminate them." Further, where allowing for en-
vironmental costs affects profitability, it may also influence man-
agement compensation, so there may be little incentive to gather
and allocate the information.'93 Without specific accountability,
individual managers have no incentive to minimize them.
187. Miriam Heller et al., Environmental Accounting Case Study: Amoco
Yorktown Refinery, in GREEN LEDGERS, supra note 183, at 47, 79.
188. Id. at 79.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The 22% figure was probably understated in that it did not include any
allowance for potential future liability for waste disposal. A Dow facility study
published in the same collection found that environmental costs, as defined, were
only 3.2% of manufacturing costs. Ajay Maindiratta & Rebecca Todd, Environ-
mental Accounting Case Study: Dow Chemical, in GREEN LEDGERS, supra note
183, at 105, 106. However, this represented only the costs of waste disposal and
treatment. Environment related components of operating labor, managers' sala-
ries, planning, and capital investment were not included. Id.
192. Todd, supra note 185, at 191.
193. Id.; Ditz et al., supra note 183, at 39. In addition, collecting the informa-
tion may give visibility to regulatory reporting obligations that are otherwise
neglected.
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This problem can extend beyond the domain of individual
managers to bias corporate decisionmaking against pollution
prevention and environmental technology projects.'94 The bene-
fits of such projects are often savings of real but unmeasured or
unallocated current costs. Those benefits may include reduced
compliance and waste disposal expenditures, as well as reduced
operating and management expenses; yet the environmental com-
ponent of these reductions are often not allocated to the specific
operation.
There are other, often indirect, long term benefits, although the
projects that achieve them impose direct, immediate costs. Thus,
pollution prevention and environmental technology projects may
well reduce the company's exposure to future liability for injuries
or waste cleanup. However, these kinds of savings are not only
indirect, but they are uncertain and contingent to a degree, and
thus hard to measure in present value. As a result, these benefits
may be discounted, or unmeasured entirely, in deciding whether
to undertake specific prevention projects. However, waste dis-
posal, regulatory compliance, and future liability exposure are
quite likely to become more expensive over time, thus making
their reduction even more valuable.
The solution is better accounting systems that identify all the
environmental costs and allocate them accurately to cost generat-
ing activities.'95 A number of specific methodologies have been
proposed; all share four central characteristics.'" First, the in-
ventory of environmental costs must be expanded beyond waste
treatment and disposal; allocation is important for environmental
labor, management, operating costs, indirect liability costs, and
less tangible benefits such as company image.'97 Second, a lon-
194. See ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 183, at 2.
195. Todd, supra note 185, at 196; TOTAL COST ASSESSMENT, supra note 183,
at 19; ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 183, at 16.
196. For detailed discussion of specific methologies see TOTAL COST ASSESS-
MENT, supra note 183, at 23-36, app. B; ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, supra note
183, at 28-45, app. C; FACILITY POLLUTION PREVENTION GUIDE, supra note 180,
at 58-64 (offering a manual for specific company adoption). See also Ditz et al.,
supra note 183, at 29-42 (an excellent introductory guide to implementing better
systems).
197. See ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 183, at 67.
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ger time horizon must be considered. Traditionally, project evalu-
ation will cover a two to five year time period. However, many
of the important indirect costs may only become evident over ten
to fifteen years.'98 Third, long term financial indicators must be
evaluated to determine the present value of costs and benefits
over this longer time horizon.'" Finally, cost allocation must be
improved to connect costs and benefits with the activities giving
rise to them.2 '
The resulting Total Cost Assessment ("TCA") will be challeng-
ing to work out, but the business and environmental payoff for
doing so should be large."0 TCA will usually favor pollution
prevention and environmental technology projects, because it may
identify and allocate the real environmental costs that these pro-
jects can save. Of course, it may not always do so, for it will also
include other costs and benefits now overlooked. The case study
of environmental accounting at the Yorktown refinery offers a
clear illustration.0 2 When the study began, environmental costs
were estimated to be three percent of operating costs;2. 3 in such
a situation, it is not surprising that these were not a major target
of management attention and cost control programs. However,
when environmental costs were calculated to actually be twenty-
two percent of operating costs, they became a much more visible
and attractive target for attention.2" Costs of this size require
that the company rethink its decisions about processes, opera-
tions, and products that cause the costs. Further, the accounting
project will have identified where the environmental costs are
caused, thus offering a better informed sense of the relative prior-
ity of different projects.
One study provides substantial evidence that adopting a TCA
approach will have a dramatic effect in promoting prevention. 5
This 1992 study of source reduction programs at twenty-nine
198. Id. at 65.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 66.
201. Todd, supra note 185, at 199-200.
202. Heller et al., supra note 187, at 79.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. DORFMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 31.
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chemical industry plants considered the importance of cost ac-
counting in those programs. "Plants with some type of cost ac-
counting program (full or partial) had an average of three times
as many source reduction activities ... as plants with no cost
accounting system."' This difference was found to be statisti-
cally significant. Improved accounting, although not very glamor-
ous, is a most important feature of prevention programs.
Several states now mandate pollution prevention planning; a
few of these include a requirement of financial planning. 7 For
example, New Jersey, as part of its mandated planning for pollu-
tion prevention, requires that companies make:
[a] comprehensive financial analysis of the costs associated with
the use, generation, release or discharge of hazardous substances
which occur as a result of current production processes at the
industrial facility, including the costs of generation of non product
output [wastes], the savings realized by investments in pollution
prevention and the more efficient use of raw materials, the cost of
the treatment and disposal of hazardous waste, and the cost of
liability insurance."c
The crucial question is whether such a mandate will be effective
in changing the way businesses think about pollution prevention
and environmental technology investments. While preparing a
specific accounting report can be required, mandating the actual
use of it in discretionary business decisionmaking is much more
problematic. In the state of Washington, however, limited case
study evidence shows that at least some of the companies subject
to the requirement found it to be a useful contribution to their
206. Id.
207. For an excellent summary of the planning requirements, see Waste Reduc-
tion Institute for Training and Applications Research, Analyzing Pollution Pre-
vention Planning Laws: From Innovation to Implementation, Draft Report (July 7,
1995).
208. See, e.g., Pollution Prevention Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-41b(12)
(West 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.95C.200 (West 1992). See also
Christopher H. Stinson, Accounting for Pollution Prevention in Washington State,
in GREEN LEDGERS, supra note 183, at 157 (discussing the response to Washing-
ton State's Pollution Prevention planning requirements by four companies); AL-




Most of the policy discussion about pollution prevention and
environmental technology, including this one, have directed atten-
tion to individual firms, their plants, and the expansive reach
which extends to their suppliers and customers." ' Industrial
ecology is a new, broader way of thinking about the environmen-
tal consequences of production and consumption. Using an analo-
gy to natural ecosystems, industrial ecology places individual
firms and their economic activities in a conceptual industrial
ecosystem."' Such thinking, as it presently emerges in environ-
mental engineering literature, emphasizes large systems, long time
horizons, and broad consideration of all the environmental impli-
cations of industrial activities." Industrial ecology is still de-
veloping as a discipline and, at this point, it is more suggestive of
possibilities than prescriptive of outcomes. An example can il-
lustrate the rich conceptual possibilities.
One central idea of industrial ecology is that waste streams
from one industrial operation can serve as raw materials for an-
other."3 This idea is an obvious suggestion once one begins
thinking in terms of ecosystems, because natural ecosystems
typically use the wastes of one organism as a nut rient or other
energy source for another. Of course, in the industrial system,
users of raw materials may have quite specific requirements, and
wastes may require substantial treatment or refining before they
can be useful. Ultimately, waste streams might be designed with
reuse in mind, so they could be tailored to meet the requirements
of a particular raw materials buyer."4
209. Stinson, supra note 208, at 158.
210. See supra notes 1, 20, 62.
211. An excellent discussion of the ecosystem image is in Robert U. Ayers,
Industrial Metabolism, in TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 37, at 23.
212. An excellent introduction can be found in THE GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL
ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 1, and especially in Matthew Weinberg et al., Industrial
Ecology: The Role of Government, id. at 123; Deanna J. Richards et al., The
Greening of Industrial Ecosystems: Overview and Perspective, id. at 1.
213. David T. Allen & Nasrin Behmanesh, Wastes as Raw Materials, in THE
GREENING OF INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 1, at 69.
214. Id. The article focuses on specific metals, noting that the relative concen-
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Ecochem, a joint venture of DuPont and ConAgra, is a success
story concerning the use .of a waste stream as raw material for a
new product." 5 ConAgra produced cheese whey, a high protein
waste that resulted from other operations.216 Together with
DuPont it developed an innovative technology to make the whey
into lactic acid which could then be made into bio-degradable
plastics known as polylactides.2"7 These plastics have the poten-
tial to be much more environmentally friendly packaging materi-
al. A production pilot plant opened in 1992 and a full scale plant,
applying the lessons learned, was scheduled to begin operating in
1994; the total investment will eventually reach $100 million.21
But forming and operating the joint venture was not always
219easy. Within DuPont, there was some resistance to the new
plastics, based on the fear that they might displace sales of exist-
ing products. In addition, some feared that this effort might de-
tract from DuPont's ongoing recycling efforts, particularly in the
early stages when the environmental benefits of polylactides were
less apparent. Finally, there were differences between the two
corporate cultures that had to be bridged:
The initial DuPont "champions" were essentially engineers, eager
to exploit the new degradable polylactide technologies, while the
"champions" within ConAgra were entrepreneurs with a strong
bias toward low-cost production of commodity products. The joint
venture also had to accommodate some differing approaches of the
parent companies. Traditional DuPont wisdom about new tech-
nology development and commercialization is that "good science
and engineering" requires large research and development spend-
ing over a long time. ConAgra, however, has an investment creed
of carefully controlling capital and achieving their stringent 20-
percent return on equity standard in a relatively short period. Thus
the partners had to reconcile very different perspectives on invest-
ment levels and payback schedules....
tration of the metal in a waste stream will be critical to whether its reuse is eco-
nomical. Often, specific metals have higher concentrations in waste streams than
in virgin supplies. Id.
215. CHANGING COURSE, supra note 20, at 280-83.
216. Id. at 281.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 282.
219. Id.
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Executives at both DuPont and ConAgra have learned a number of
lessons from the Ecochern experience. Special effort is needed to
turn sustainable development opportunities into profitable reality.
New forms of business alliances may be required. Furthermore,
while the two companies believe that sustainable business projects
can be profitable, returns may not emerge immediately.22
When ConAgra and DuPont join forces to turn a waste material
into a new product's raw material, they are acting like organisms
in an industrial ecosystem. Industrial operations can be seen as
part of a larger industrial ecosystem. It appears obvious to use
wastes as raw materials, and indeed eventually design them with
such use in mind. The potential environmental benefits are great,
but so are the challenges to achieve them. The individual firms
and plants - the organisms in this ecosystem - will have a
whole new basis for interaction with each other and will doubt-
less have to develop whole new ways of conducting those inter-
actions. The organizational structure and culture of businesses
will certainly have to evolve and adapt to achieve this potential.
Equally significant changes will ultimately be required of regu-
lators.
V. CONCLUSION
Preventing pollution is a tantalizing prospect - it offers great
promise for achieving better, cheaper environmental protection
while supporting business competitiveness. However, prevention
requires a great deal of initiative and commitment from compa-
nies - more than traditional pollution control. Control steers
companies toward buying end-of-the-pipe cleanup technology. In
contrast, pollution prevention requires companies to rethink their
operations, their products, and their technologies to make them
cleaner, rather than to clean up afterward. The center of attention
moves from the end of the pipe to the inside of the plant, and the
demands on the company's initiative and innovation are much
greater.
Prevention also requires that policy thinking shift away from
the traditional emphasis on regulator's commands and enforce-
ment. Control approaches are regulator centered, since getting
220. Id. at 282-83.
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standards written and enforced is the central task. Prevention
shifts the center of attention to the company decisions that create
wastes in the first place. This shift of emphasis, from regulator
commands to company innovations, results from the kind of
company decisions and actions that prevention requires.
This survey of the successful programs so far shows that two
kinds of business efforts are needed. First, there must be a cre-
ative, innovative spark to conceive how things can be done clean-
ly. This spark might then illuminate possible changes at several
different levels. It might mean change in basic operations, or it
could mean incremental or wholesale redesign of industrial pro-
cesses. Even more fundamentally, it can mean redesigning the
company's products. Most broadly, the whole product life cycle,
from raw materials use through production, to product use and
disposal can be rethought. However, innovative sparks are not
enough; successful prevention efforts require company policies
and organizational programs to bring such sparks to full flame.
The programs must have commitment shown by top management,
a supportive organizational structure, and they must involve em-
ployees firm-wide, relating prevention to the organization's core
values. Broader and different environmental cost accounting will
be a key. A change in the organization's culture will ultimately
be required.
Such fundamental changes in the way business thinks about the
environment can be influenced by many factors. The values and
expectations of all the stakeholders are certainly important -
employees and managers, stockholders, customers, suppliers, and
others. Yet, to pursue prevention as a policy, we must proceed
with a clear idea of the kind of business behavior it requires, and
use whatever - admittedly incomplete - knowledge we have to
encourage and support that behavior.
To maintain the focus on developing a richer sense of the busi-
ness realities and opportunities of pollution prevention, this Arti-
cle has avoided consideration of the traditional environmental law
regulatory system and its impact on pollution prevention. The
variety and complexity of business efforts that prevention re-
quires, as developed here, show that they may be difficult for
regulators to directly command. Creative thinking, organizational
commitment, and cultural change can be more easily inspired
1996] PREVENTING POLLUTION 57
than required. However, the traditional regulatory system does
create many environmental performance incentives for business.
The conventional theory asserts that pollution control regulation
uniformly discourages new environmental technology and pol-
lution prevention. However, the accumulating but still incomplete
evidence is much more mixed, and some recent efforts have been
launched to make the control system more hospitable to preven-
tion. Beyond accommodating prevention in the traditional regula-
tory apparatus, many recent policy efforts have sought to promote
prevention directly, and later research will consider these pro-
grams in light of the business efforts that prevention requires.

